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Abstract 
This thesis aims to explore the role and impact of Israel's domestic factor in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict dynamic in the period of 2009-2019, under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It uses the theoretical framework of domestic 
constraints in foreign policy, as Israel's actions in regards to the Palestinians can be 
considered a type of foreign policy. To simplify between various sources of domestic 
influence, the thesis focuses on the party factions within the coalition governments and 
their bargaining power relative to each other. Thus, the study is based on the formation of 
the coalitions as the primary arena of internal political contestation, and on the subsequent 
actions of the government as an agent with executive power in the state.  
The research examines the causal connections between internal political 
contestation and foreign policy on the basis that leadership uses the international level to 
achieve objectives at the domestic level. The objective of the thesis is to enhance the 
theoretical framework by exploring the mutually reciprocal relations between domestic 
politics and foreign policy. It suggests that conflictual behavior is not contained to foreign 
policy, but has also had repercussions for the society as a whole. Accommodating to 
radical elements and avoiding resolving contentious issues might sustain the leadership's 
power, but this has put it into a more difficult position to solve long-term problems. 
Legitimizing the regime erodes the possibilities for peaceful conflict resolution, because 
alternative options are not explored. Initiatives for retroactive legalization and judicial 
overhaul weaken the position of rule of law. As these plans are proposed in the protracted 
conflict situation, they also have the effect of persisting the conflict despite the costs it 
 
 
entails. As the findings are limited to one case, further research is needed to assess their 
applicability. 
 
Keywords: domestic factors, foreign policy analysis, two-level games, coalition 
formation, retaining power, persistence of protracted conflicts 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research question and relevance 
On April 9, 2019, Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent prime minister of Israel, 
won the parliamentary elections and is appointed to form the next coalition. It would be his 
fifth overall, and since 2009, his fourth consequent government. In the last decade, the 
center of gravity in the coalition has been gradually moving to the right, with the coalition 
formed after the 2015 elections the most right-wing government Israel has ever had.
1
  
Since 1967, Israel has been occupying the Palestinian territories of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. In the 1990s, Israel and the Palestine Liberation organization (PLO) agreed 
to hold peace negotiations with each other. This resulted in the Oslo Accords, signed in 
1993 and 1995, which created a limited self-governance for the Palestinians in the 
territories. The full terms of the accords were never implemented. Both parties have 
declared that the two-state solution, i.e. creating a Palestinian state besides Israel is their 
objective and obligation in solving the conflict.
2
 Nevertheless, there has been limited 
progress in the conflict‟s resolution since the collapse of the Oslo process.  
The ten years of Netanyahu‟s rule have thus far resulted in a degradation in the 
relations between the conflict‟s parties. The latest direct talks were held in 2013-2014 and 
the period has been marred with regular eruptions of violence. Under these circumstances 
it would be expected to see Israelis deeply concerned about their conflict with the 
Palestinians and demanding the government to look for ways to end the violence. 
Subverting expectations, the Palestinian question has been effectively marginalized in the 
political arena.
3
 Netanyahu's premiership has downgraded the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
                                                          
1
 Compared with the center point in the parliament of Israel to take into account that the content of what is 
considered to be „right‟ and „left‟ can also move over time.  
2
 Annapolis Conference: Joint Understanding and Statements, Joint Understanding on Negotiations, adopted 
on November 27, 2007. 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IsraelOPt_JointUnderstandingOnNegotiations2007.p
df (used May 16, 2019) 
3
 Lazaroff, Tovah. (2019). Only 11% of Israeli voters to prioritize Palestinian conflict in the elections. The 
Jerusalem Post, February 21. https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Only-11-percent-of-Israeli-voters-
care-about-the-Palestinian-conflict-581269 (used May 16, 2019) 
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from a central issue to a footnote. Instead, he is offering a perspective that Israel continues 
to fight for its very existence. This view sees enemies to the Zionist project both abroad 
and within the Israeli society, who try to undermine the established state from the inside.
4
 
The problem is relevant because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been termed as 
the most intractable conflict in the Middle East. Thus, analysis into the factors that have 
resulted in its protractedness, but also demotion from the central issue can refine our 
understanding about the implications of the domestic setting in the situation of an extended 
conflict. This understanding can then be applied for other relevant cases.  
Domestic political factors have been used to analyze the emergence and the 
outcome of the Oslo process.
5
 The literature regarding Israel‟s conflict management after 
the Second Intifada makes references to internal political inputs,
6
 but no study explicitly 
looking into the internal political working of the state and the degradation in the peace 
process under the leadership of Netanyahu has been to the author‟s knowledge conducted. 
This research can only offer preliminary insights into the matter due to the limited scope of 
the thesis and dependence on secondary sources. Thus it is conducted as exploratory case 
study, designing a study based on the formation of the coalitions as the primary arena 
where internal political contestation occurs, and on the subsequent actions of the 
government as the agents with executive power in the state.  
The objective of the thesis is to examine the impact of Israeli internal political 
contestation on the peace process. As the conflict is intrinsically linked with the Israeli 
society, the domestic factors have had an influence on the negotiations, and the actions 
conducted by the domestic actors regarding the peace process has had an influence on the 
society. It is a case of agents and their decisions, and of structures reciprocally influencing 
each other. Furthermore, it links together the first level, that being international relations, 
                                                          
4
 Scheindlin, Dahlia. (2017) Ten Years with Netanyahu: Maintaining Israel, the Conflict – and Himself. 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, International Policy Analysis. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13126.pdf (used May 
13, 2019). P 3. 
5
 Barawi, Hassan A. (2004). Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, 1988-2004. Routledge. 
6
 Such as Maoz, Zeev. (2008). Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign 
Policy,-University of Michigan Press.; Gorenberg, Gershom. (2011). The Unmaking of Israel. HarperCollins 
Publishers; and Shafir, Gershon. (2017). A Half Century of Occupation: Israel, Palestine, and the World's 
Most Intractable Conflict. University of California Press. 
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and the second level of domestic affairs. Thus the government‟s actions regarding the 
peace process are not contained to their relations with the Palestinians, but have wider 
repercussions in the Israeli society.  
The premise of the research is that domestic political factors have had a relative 
significance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dynamic. Thus it does not take the conflict 
parties as unitary actors, but claims that the relations between the sides are causally 
connected with the internal political contestation, in which parties seek to gain and retain 
power. Parties operate in the domestic political setting and their power is based on that 
setting. These relations can be conceptualized as a type of foreign policy, because while 
Palestine is not a state, the conflict is held between two nations and the Palestinian 
Authority is internationally recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people. Due 
to limited scope, the research focuses on only Israel‟s domestic factors. Because only the 
Israelis are backed by the power of the full-fledged state, giving them much more leverage 
in negotiations or choosing not to have them, this restriction is justified.  
 
Structure of the thesis and overview of the sources 
The thesis is made up of three chapters and a conclusion. 
The first chapter introduces the theoretical framework of domestic actors 
conducting foreign policy in a protracted conflict setting. Putnam‟s concept of two-level 
games is used to establish the link between international and domestic level, in which the 
leadership is conducting actions in the international level to achieve their objectives in the 
domestic level. Thus the foreign policy carried out by the state is fundamentally political 
and dependent on the interests of the agents who have power in the decision-making.  
A wide array of domestic factors can have an influence on the decisions taken by 
the government. Thus the thesis uses the conceptualization of the actors within the 
coalition government, made up of party factions, and their bargaining power to conduct 
policy in their interests. The aim of this chapter is to delve into the factors that influence 
the behaviour of coalition parties in their relations with the domestic society, how these 
factors are represented in the decision-making process, and what are the expected 
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outcomes of the strategies actors use depending on these factors. The chapter concludes 
with an assessment of the limitations of the theoretical framework and the implications that 
the empirical case can provide for. 
The second chapter provides an overview of the research design and the 
methodology used to carry out the empirical study. The chapter presents the reasoning for 
using specific concepts and their operationalization within the context of a case study. The 
aim of methodology is to link together the theoretical framework and the empirical 
research. 
The third chapter considers the empirical case of Israel‟s internal political 
contestation in determining the output of the foreign policy decision-making. The objective 
of this chapter is to describe and analyze the implications of this contestation to evaluate 
the theory in light of the empirical explanation. The segment is divided into two 
subchapters. The first subchapter examines the internal political dynamics of Israel that 
create a background under which circumstances the foreign policy is carried out and the 
reasons why the paralysis in conflict resolution is dangerous for the Israeli society. Next, 
the chapter explores the peace negotiation strategy under the leadership of Netanyahu, and 
accommodating and discrediting strategies that the government has used to consolidate 
their power. In the second part the parliamentary elections of 2009, 2013, 2015, and 2019, 
and the events during the election cycles are analyzed to assess the changes in the 
government formation that have brought about the strategies presented before.  
Data for the research will be gathered from primary sources, e.g. election results 
and coalition documents, secondary sources, e.g. scholarly articles and NGO reports, and 
articles from the Israeli and international media. The design of the research takes into 
consideration that the information about all the variables that could be influential in the 
decision-making cannot be provided and the outcome of the decisions might not always 
accurately reflect the intentions of the decision-makers due to the factors not in their 
control. Thus, simplifications are necessary. As the purpose of the research is to conduct an 
explorative study, the research can be conducted without getting insights from the 
decision-makers in the government. The limitations set by the availability of data is 
10 
 
mitigated by incorporating a wide array of sources and references, thereby reducing bias 
and laying a foundation for further analysis. 
Public opinion polls are used to gauge the sentiments among the population, 
because the government is presumed to be sensitive to shifts in the electorate‟s views. 
Mainly, these address the views among the Jewish population in Israel. Specific notions to 
Jews, Arab citizens of Israel, and Israelis as amounting to both groups are made to 
distinguish between the segments. While focusing on the solely Jewish segment omits 
nearly 20% of the Israeli population, it takes into account that this is the ethnic group that 
holds power in the society and the Jewish parties are competing for that power. Three 
quarters of the Jewish population believes that crucial decisions on peace and security, that 
is in the conflict resolution with the Palestinians, should only be taken by a Jewish 
majority.
7
 Thus, the Jewish parties that make up the government are more incentivized to 
take into account the Jewish majority of the population and the focus on them is justified. 
When relevant, the opinions reported are distinguished between the political leaning of the 
electorate to account for the audience prioritization of the parties.  
 
  
                                                          
7
 Hermann, Tamar; Anabi, Or; Heller, Ella; Omar, Fadi. (2018). The Israeli Democracy Index 2018. The 
Israel Democracy Institute. P 87. 
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1 DOMESTIC FACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 
International relations are fundamentally embedded in domestic politics.
8
 Bueno de 
Mesquita (2002) summarizes the premise of this approach, saying that "[l]eaders, not 
states, choose actions.”9 In the words of Fearon (1998), this theory takes into account that 
"differences in states' political institutions, cultures, economic structures, or leadership 
goals unrelated to [the state‟s] relative power are causally relevant to explaining different 
foreign policy choices."
10
 The theoretical framework used in the thesis considers the role 
of domestic factors in explaining outputs in foreign policy decision-making. Domestic 
factors constrain the leadership‟s actions as the domestic setting is the main level the 
leadership is focusing on to secure their power. 
Foreign policy analysis emerged from a framework developed by Snyder, Bruck 
and Sapin (1954) who sought to generalize states' behavior based on how they made policy 
decisions.
11
 This focus point differed from traditional schools of thought regarding 
international relations, such as realist approaches. In contrast to a domestic constraints‟ 
approach, theories that hold the state to be a rational and unitary actor use the nature of the 
international political system to explain the behavior of states.
12
 Realism perceives states to 
be the predominant, if not the only actors in the international arena. The foreign policy of 
states is made by their national government and its primary aims are to keep the state's 
sovereignty and independence.
13
 
Realism draws a separation between a state‟s foreign and domestic policies. The 
driving question for neorealism is what is the basis of the international structure and how it 
                                                          
8
 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. (2002). Domestic Politics and International Relations. International Studies 
Quarterly, 46(1), pp. 1-9. P 2. 
9
 Bueno de Mesquita 2002: 4. 
10
 Fearon, James D. (1998). Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 1(1), pp. 289-313. Pp 302. 
11
 Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H. W., & Sapin, Burton. (1954). Decision-making as an approach to the study 
of international politics. (Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3.). Oxford, England: Princeton University 
Organizational. 
12
 Smith, Steve. (1986) Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview. Review of International Studies, 
12(1), pp. 13-29. P 14. 
13
 Webber, Mark; Smith Michael. (2014). Foreign Policy in a Transformed World. Routledge. P 12. 
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forms actors' behaviors.
14
 The internal aspects of a state are through this prism by and large 
irrelevant to how a state conducts its foreign policy.
15
 Realist approach assumes the state to 
be a "black box", meaning that it is not necessary to look into domestic political processes 
to explain a state's behavior in international sphere.
16
 To justify the differences in foreign 
policy, the concept of power is used as a central explaining factor for both the key 
characteristics of a foreign policy and its success rate.
17
  
The domestic constraints‟ approach does not claim that the international structure 
has no influence on the leaders‟ options. The first level can be used to explain some 
general trends in a country‟s foreign policy that are related to its discordant objectives. 
However, it does not look into decision-making within a state.
18
 The deficiency in the 
theories that primarily emphasize the international structure is their underestimation of the 
role that public support has for both a government's ability to implement its decisions and 
the overall direction of its foreign policy. This is especially important in enduring rivalries, 
where the government must be able to mobilize public support repeatedly for a costly or 
protracted conflict.
19
 Structural realist accounts are also insufficient for explaining the 
similarities in a state‟s behavior under different structural conditions, or variants in the 
sameness.
20
 
Instead, domestic factors are seen as holding significant explanatory power in 
determining the foreign policy of a state. Domestic influences are public opinion, electoral 
politics, interest groups, ideological preferences and bureaucratic politics.
21
 These factors 
form the backdrop that the decision-makers must take into account when they want to 
effectively implement their decisions and stay in power. Above all, it is the domestic 
                                                          
14
 Hudson, Valerie M. (2013). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. Pp 12. 
15
 Barari 2004: 5-6. 
16
 Hosti, Ole R. (2006). Making American Foreign Policy. New York, Abingdon: Routledge. P 327. 
17
 Webber & Smith 2014: 13-14. 
18
 Smith 1986: 17. 
19
 Mor, Ben D. (1997). Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: The Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution, 
Journal of Peace Research, 34(2), pp. 197–215. P 199. 
20
 Stein, Janice Gross. (1999). The Political Economy of Security Agreements: The Linked Costs of Failure 
at Camp David. In Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Evans, Peter 
B.; Jacobson, Harold K.; Putnam, Robert D. (eds). Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, pp 77-103. P 78. 
21
 Holsti 2006: 327. 
13 
 
political system that determines the type of leader that can gain authority in that certain 
state. When a leader has emerged, they will likely wish to remain in power. For that, the 
domestic audience forms the primary focus point for a leader because it is the base for his 
power. Furthermore, leaders are more likely to lose power in internal overthrowal, either 
due to a coup or in an election, than in a foreign invasion.
22
  
International politics are thus not seen as a given set of systems that work 
independently of choices made by societies and individuals.
23
 Rather, these choices lead to 
a political process that produces foreign policy actions.
24
 The general direction of a state in 
international affairs is rooted in the domestic setting and the dominant views in that 
society.
25
 These are the discordant objectives of the state and and perceptions of its nation, 
as conceptualized by Brecher and which will be elaborated on later. Therefore, the public 
imposes constraints on the range of policies which the leadership can pursue.  
The result is that instead of determining how states conduct their affairs on the 
international stage, politicians use the global arena as a venue where they try to maximize 
their domestic political advantage.
26
 Leaders are keen to guard their own and their state's 
reputation in the foreign arena because the cost that harming this reputation might have 
detrimental effects in domestic politics.
27
 The dual setting of international and domestic 
level produces two-level games, where the leadership can make use of conditions on either 
level to gain support for their own preferences.
28
  
                                                          
22
 Fearon, James D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. The 
American Political Science Review, 88(3), pp. 577-592. P 581. 
23
 Bueno de Mesquita 2002: 7. 
24
 Soetendorp, Ben. (2007). The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History, Cases. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan US. P 55. 
25
 Hagan, Joe. (1994). Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness. Mershon International Studies 
Review, 38(2), 183-207. DOI: 10.2307/222714. P 183. 
26
 Bueno de Mesquita 2002: 8. 
27
 Fearon 1994: 581. 
28
 Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. 
International Organization,42(3), pp. 427-460. P 434.  
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1.1 Core concepts 
The links between international and national level politics provide the government 
an opportunity to use the first level to achieve their goals in the second. Tsebelis uses the 
concept of nested games to explain why an actor might choose an option that, from the 
viewpoint of an observer, is either against his interests or subpar suboptimal under existing 
circumstances. He claims that in these situations, the decisions made appear to be 
suboptimal, because the observer does not take into account that the leader is playing 
games in multiple arenas.
29
 Both arenas produce constraints and opportunities for leaders 
to advance their agenda.
30
 
For maximizing their freedom of action, a government needs to achieve success in 
both games. Over domestic negotiations, the government seeks power by responding to the 
interests of domestic groups and building coalitions with them. At the international level, 
governments are seeking a solution that gives them maximum leverage for satisfying 
domestic pressures, while avoiding the outcome that their domestic coalition would not 
support. An executive who ignores either of these games does not stay in power for long. 
While consistency between both game boards is a favorable position for the player, 
sometimes rational acts for a domestic game produce suboptimal outcomes in the 
international level, and vice versa. The two levels become linked when any agreement 
reached in the international negotiations needs to gain the ratification of the domestic 
constituency. This ratification does not have to be a formal procedure, but is necessary for 
the emergence of two-level negotiations.
31
  
Foreign policy analysis is multifactorial and multilevel at the same time: it 
considers a wide range of variables and covers several levels of analysis. The complexity 
of analysis is further increased because not all decisions result in a wanted outcome.
32
 This 
                                                          
29
 Tsebelis, George. (1990). Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. California Series On 
Social Choice and Political Economy. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Pp 1, 
7. 
30
 Hagan 1995: 117; Putnam 1988: 427-428. 
31
 Putnam 1988: 434-436. 
32
 Hudson 2013: 6-7. 
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is a fundamental shortage of analyzing decision-making and decision implementing. 
Therefore it is impossible with our current information-collecting and weighing capacity to 
trace all influences of any given decision. Additionally, when we look at humans as the 
agents conducting acts of policy-making, the specific people who are making the decisions 
become important. They are not some generic rational utility maximizers, equally 
weighing the information at hand and calculating the most optimal decision.
33
 Rather, the 
leaders are bound by their personal views and the surrounding elements in both the 
domestic and international settings. 
In the case of a protracted conflict, the conflict influences both the agents who 
decide and the structure in which they make the decisions. Protracted conflicts persist over 
time due to various reasons. These can be divided into three categories. The first are 
intangible aims such as national interest, a perceived place in the power balance vis-a-vis 
the adversary, and existential fear. These are objectives connected to power, territory, and 
ideology. The second are tangible goals, such as competition for material or territorial 
benefits. Both the tangible and intangible aims of the state are rooted in the perceptions of 
the nation in said state, meaning these perceptions identify how the nation sees itself and 
the position of their state.
34
  
The third are decisions by the leadership. While the decisions are made based on 
perceptions, they are more actor-specific, because an individual or a group of decision-
makers chooses a specific course of action between different options. These decisions can 
take the form of conflict-sustaining acts, that is when the outcome of their implementation 
is to protract the conflict. Brecher (2016) categorizes conflict-sustaining acts into four 
groups based on their nature. These are political hostility, violence, economic 
discrimination, and verbal hostility or propaganda.
35
  
Drawing from these notions, Brecher's model on persistence for protracted conflicts 
forms a causal chain. For this thesis, the chain is simplified, because the theoretical 
analysis does not need distinguishing between several categories of concepts within a 
                                                          
33
 Hudson 2013: 7. 
34
 Brecher, Michael. (2016). The World of Protracted Conflicts. Lanham: Lexington Books. Pp 144-153. 
35
 Brecher 2016: 153. 
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single step of the chain. The chain begins with discordant objectives. These are the 
intangible aims that together with the balance of capability between conflict parties form 
the independent variables. The second step in the chain are perceptions, which are 
embedded in the operational environment that is made up of the content of the independent 
variables. The last step is decisions. Some of these decisions are likely to be conflict-
sustaining acts due to hostile relations between the conflict parties. These acts will cause 
the conflict to persist. Thus, the decisions made by the conflict parties can result in 
protracting the animosity by sustaining the hostile behavior between said parties. If these 
decisions, however, have conflict-reducing outcomes, the causal chain would turn into a 
conflict termination model.
36
  
Each step of this model has a possibility of intervention, where change in the state‟s 
behavior becomes possible. Usually, the direction is linear. Shifts in the state‟s political 
standing or values gives way to changes in perceptions, which thus bring about alternative 
decisions. The decision-makers, however, might not all have same views about most 
rational behavior. Furthermore, the decision-making takes place in a context where various 
domestic system pressures, external system pressures and self-interests of the leadership 
compete to achieve their objectives.
37
 This means that the objectives and the perceptions 
constrain the possible decisions that the leadership can make, but do not determine each 
single action.  
 
1.2 Influence on the leadership 
While Putnam focuses on domestic-level setting as as whole, Joe D. Hagan divides 
it into two critical games that influence the leader‟s prospects towards foreign policy. The 
first one concerns building coalitions that support their policies. The second one is driven 
by the logic of political survival, thus making retaining power the long term strategic goal 
                                                          
36
 Brecher 2016: 154. 
37
 Brecher 2016: 294-295. 
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for all leaders.
38
 It is usually a domestic setting, rather than an international one, that makes 
the leader vulnerable to overthrowal.  
Coalition-building is necessary because, particularly in democracies, but also in 
autocratic states, the leader is not the sole executive decision-maker. Firstly, the 
constituency must support the proposed policies by either electing the government or not 
protesting against its decisions, if it moves away from campaign promises. Secondly, 
domestic politics are entwined with internal contestation over authority, as lots of formal 
and informal factions demand their slice of the cake. In cases where a decision is not made 
rapidly by a small group on the top of the state, the issue might become politicized. This is 
especially likely when the power to influence decision-making is divided among 
autonomous and strong actors, and when these actors differ in their stances towards the 
policy. When the cabinet itself is divided over policy matters, it gives further points of 
access for interest groups to weigh on their representatives, who are in turn incentivized to 
look for allies outside.
39
  
Retaining power is the ruling groups long-term strategic goal. For that reason they 
have to maintain the support of their domestic base, even though there might be changes 
within that base.
40
 If the leadership is sufficiently challenged on their foreign policy 
decisions, this policy needs adjustment to reduce domestic costs. This, though, does not 
mean that all policy questions are politicized in the eyes of the domestic audience. 
However, two dynamics between policy-making groups and the general public make the 
leadership sensitive to the concerns of their constituency. Firstly, the domestic political 
arena is usually characterized by the occurrence of competing groups who are looking for 
ways to maximize their influence. That leads to the politicizing of even those issues that 
would otherwise be left aside. Secondly, the public easily perceives foreign policy 
questions as a reflection of the general credibility of the government and its stance in the 
world affairs. A leader who is seen to be cowering before the enemy will face significant 
                                                          
38
 Hagan, Joe D. (1995). Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy. In Foreign Policy 
Analysis: Continuity and change in its second generation. Neack, Laura; Hey, Jeanne A. K.; Haney, Patrick 
Jude (eds), Cambridge: Prentice Hall, pp. 117-143. P 122. 
39
 Hagan 1995: 122, 140-141. 
40
 Gagnon, V. P. (1994). Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia. International 
Security, 19(3), pp. 130-166. DOI: 10.2307/2539081. Pp 134-135. 
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opposition to his power at home, putting him under pressure to satisfy the electorate‟s 
demands.
41
  
The more vulnerable the leadership perceives itself to be for overthrowal, the more 
sensitive they are to their power base‟s opinion. This vulnerability can emerge both from 
the wider political environment and within the ruling coalition. This happens under several 
conditions, of which the following list is non-exhaustive, as there can also be additional 
circumstances, applicable to a small number of cases.  
Firstly, the coalition can divided over certain issues. This challenge is amplified 
when these issues form the core views for their supporting constituency. Secondly, the 
relative strength of the coalition‟s and opposition‟s power groups has an impact on the 
leadership‟s cohesion and stability of its power. These factors are best explained with the 
differences in outcomes if only one condition applies. Even if the coalition is highly 
divided, if the leader is able to execute his dominance over supporting groups, they would 
lack strength to defy his will. If the opposition is strong, but leadership is internally 
cohesive, the coalition would feel more secure in their power and be less concerned over 
finding compromises. 
Thirdly, there might be formal or non-formal, but highly influential rules of 
politics. These include the separation of powers and their capacities vis-a-vis each other, 
electoral considerations, such as the start of the new campaign,
42
 and social discord in the 
society and its impact for rule.
43
  
Fourthly, there are differences in the amount and distribution of benefits a 
leadership can offer to their supporters. This can result in a curse of resources, where a 
naturally resource-rich economy grows less rapidly than other economies that lack these 
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assets.
44
 In a political context, however, it is the change of resources or perception of it that 
gives the opposition a chance to promise bigger returns, thus increasing the leadership's 
vulnerability.  
This also matters in the context of the type of the regime. In democracies, 
governments are relying on wide domestic power. Transparency and avoidance of 
corruption that the electorate demands mean that the benefits are more equally distributed 
and the divergence between regime-supporters and regime-opponents is not great. This 
means that the supporters‟ political loyalty is weak, which makes democratic rulers more 
sensitive to general public opinion, as even small policy failures could mean a loss in next 
elections. In autocracies, however, the leader has more benefits that he offers only to his 
supporters and thus the size of their winning coalition is smaller. Hence, the leader can 
ignore public dissatisfaction to a far greater extent.
45
  
Fiftly, the character of politics within that society has an effect on leadership 
vulnerability. This is a wide notion, as it can describe a range of factors, including 
politicization to party politics to personalization of politics. Putnam summarizes that an 
accurate representation of domestic determinants on international relations “must stress 
politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), 
legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and 
institutional arrangements.”46 Taken altogether, these are the elements that a ruling elite 
takes into account in policy-making in order to carry out its will, especially in 
democracies. Even in the cases when a ruler is less concerned by overthrowal, for example 
if they know that their age or health would not allow them to stay in office for long, they 
can not implement decisions that the vocal majority of the society rejects. Thus they have 
to keep in mind the politics within the nation.  
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In short, we have political fragmentation and power-sharing in both the coalition 
and opposition, rules of governing, economic benefits, and the politics in the society as 
major elements that influence the dynamics between the society and leadership.  
 
1.3 Influence on foreign policy 
To simplify between different decision units who can all have influence, Hermann, 
Hermann and Hagan (1987) conceptualized on the ultimate decision unit. This is a 
nebulous set of authorities that channel numerous domestic and international factors to 
finally make a foreign policy decision. This does not necessarily mean that the unit is 
formed of one separate entity. It may consist of several bodies, but by definition it is the 
unit that has the power to commit the resources of the government to back a certain 
decision to a point where the implementation of that policy is not easily reversed. 
Furthermore, the composition of this ultimate decision-making unit depends on the 
decisions to be made. Therefore this conceptualization takes into account that not all 
decisions are made by the same set of people.
47
 
Unless the ultimate decision unit consists of a single leader, group behavior 
dynamics and a variety of conflicting preferences come into play in reaching the decision. 
This results in inter-group compromises or bargaining.
48
 In coalitions, no single actor or 
group has the capacity to allocate the state's resources behind their own decisions. Rather, 
all involved members must reach an agreement, as by going rogue, they have the power to 
block initiatives. Hagan et al (2001) lay out these means as "(1) executing a veto, (2) 
threatening to terminate the ruling coalition, and/or (3) withholding the resources necessary 
for action or the approval needed for their use." These actors are also constrained by their 
constituencies, as they are held accountable for their views by their voters. Individual 
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members in a coalition play another two-level game of bargaining with both opposing 
members in the coalition and with factional leaders of their constituency.
49
  
Coalition theory literature points at two underlying principles for the forming of a 
coalition. According to the size principle, parties seek to form a minimum winning 
coalition in which they have just enough support in the parliament. A similar logic applies 
to decision-making within the coalition, where gaining a wider support than necessary to 
pass a policy initiative is avoided, because it would require making further compromises, 
dispersing resources, and/or sharing credit. Policy distance principles address the question 
of ideological preferences, with the premise that actors would be more willing to form a 
coalition with players who have similar views to themselves.
50
  
In addition to these main principles, coalition forming is affected by the existence 
and strength of secondary factors. A pivotal actor is defined as the median player between 
right- and left-wing, without whose support an agreement is not concluded, thus giving 
disproportionate strength to his own views or giving him a possibility to extract 
concessions for supporting either side. Political logrolling can occur when there are single-
issue parties within the coalition. These parties have strong views on a specific issue, but 
are willing to bargain over other topics. While opposing partners can run into deadlock if 
they have incompatible goals, exchanging favors can also have the outcome of 
overcommitting state's resources. The degree of coalition members' willingness to bargain 
has an impact on coalition facilitation. Even if parties have great policy differences, 
political maturity, norms of cooperation and a reliable party discipline can streamline the 
making of compromises and make the coalition function more as a single group.
51
  
Mor (1997) identifies three parameters that determine the policy choice on the 
leadership level. „(1) the structure of public opinion (i.e., the size of the gap between 
supporters and opponents of accommodation); (2) the leadership‟s conflict-related beliefs 
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(i.e., the leaders‟ own preference for a negotiated settlement, independently of the public 
opinion) and (3) the leadership‟s sensitivity to public opinion.“  
The different combinations of these parameters demonstrate that the interaction 
between public opinion and two leadership-related parameters yields different outcomes in 
policy-making.
52
 While it is difficult to assign concrete weighs on these parameters in the 
decision-making in a case study, especially over a time period, some basic assumptions can 
be made due to the democratic structure of politics. Firstly, in the leadership of the winning 
party of the election has the strongest relative power; and the most popular parties or 
candidates tend to be moderate in their views. Secondly, the leadership can be considered 
to be highly sensitive to public opinion. From these premises it can be derived that the 
structure of public opinion has relatively more weight on influencing the government‟s 
decisions.
53
 
The main effect of domestic political processes is not that they determine the state‟s 
international behavior, but that they diminish or amplify the willingness of the leadership 
to make commitments or take risks.
54
 Domestic opposition can have both “pull” and 
“push” dynamics, depending on the character of the political environment and international 
issues which the state faces.
55
 Hagan identifies (1995) three basic strategies that leaders use 
in foreign policy-making to react to their opposition: ““bargaining and controversy 
avoidance”, “legitimization of the regime and its policies”, or “insulating policy from 
domestic political pressures”.”56 
Bargaining and controversy avoidance is representative of the strategy of 
accommodation. When the opposition is strong enough to challenge the leader on his 
policies, leaders seek to retain their power by avoiding controversial topics or actions that 
might be deemed as demonstrating weakness. A similar dynamic may emerge when the 
coalition itself is divided over policy-making issues or rivaling ambitions. When building 
coalitions based on accommodation, leaders use bargaining tactics with actors who need to 
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approve their decisions, thereby reaching compromises. All cases result in a foreign policy 
that is low-risk and often keeps the status quo. This happens because “[p]olitics constrains 
initiatives that are strong in intensity and commitment”. This phenomenon most typically 
emerges in democracies, especially in non-first-past-the-post parliamentary systems that 
rely on coalition governments or which have a highly fragmented party system.
57
  
Legitimization of the regime and its policies occurs under mobilization strategies, 
when leaders react to opposition to their plans by doubling down. While also directed at 
discouraging the opposition, the purpose of mobilization is to increase the support of the 
government by strengthening and widening its base. Hagan (1995) describes the leaders‟ 
various tactics under mobilization as “(1) appealing to nationalism and imperialist themes, 
or “scapegoating” or “bashing” foreign elements; (2) showing that the leaders have a 
special capacity and wisdom for maintaining the nation‟s security and international status; 
and/or (3) diverting attention away from divisive domestic problems”.58 With these 
methods, the ruling elite intends to retain its power.  
In building coalitions, leaders are in the offense, drumming up their support and 
discrediting the opposition. This approach results in a foreign policy that is assertive and 
conflictual, demonstrating leader‟s ability to rule. While mobilization can occur in 
rhetorics only, it can also lead to making commitments to use force. In contrast with 
accommodation, mobilization is usually linked with authoritarian regimes, but is not 
exclusive to them. Legitimization of the regime can also be taken up under various 
conditions in democracies. These could be when the general audience looks for simple, 
black and white policy decisions; or when the leadership perceives itself as vulnerable to 
defeat in the next election and sees that pushing a particular position may improve their 
standing.
59
 
Deflecting, suppressing, and overriding the opposition are parts of the insulation 
strategy. This dynamic differs from the preceding two because it characterizes a situation 
in which the domestic political impact on foreign policy is weak. This occurs when a 
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leader is able to establish a separation between domestic and foreign policy issues. This 
does not mean that the opposition to his views is always insignificant. Rather, the leader 
uses various tactics to ignore or suppress the opposition or pressure them into support with 
favors or concessions. In the short-term, this is most visible in a crisis situation, when the 
decision-making authority is concentrated on the very top. In other cases, leaders are able 
to play other actors against each other to retain power.
60
 
These strategies demonstrate that the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy-
making is not straightforward, but depends on the intensity of opposition and the strategies 
leaders choose to pursue to respond to it. Domestic political games are subtle, however, as 
there are still two other dimensions to consider. Firstly, unless under exceptional 
circumstances, the direction of policy on both levels is determined by the preferences of 
the leadership. Secondly, international constraints on the first level limit the range of 
options for the government. Taken altogether, domestic politics have an effect on whether 
the leadership is willing to increase their commitment to international agreements or to 
become more risk-taking.
61
 This is dependent on how electorally vulnerable they perceive 
themselves to be and what are the best strategies to retain power.
62
  
1.4 Assessment 
Both the formation of a coalition and its subsequent policy actions do not occur in a 
vacuum, but within the context of a wide array of domestic and international pressures. 
Thus, while coalition politics can offer some insights into why a certain policy direction 
was taken or not, it is difficult to measure the impact of single actors within the decision-
making group. This wide array of factors makes it impossible to offer a clear-cut and fully 
cohesive theoretical framework of the role and impact that domestic pressures can have on 
the government. Thus, the existing literature is splattered with notions of different factors 
and causal processes, but even more than usual the domestic approaches‟ theoretical 
concepts are either case-specific or difficult to place within larger framework.  
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To simplify, the thesis uses the approach of constraints and determinants. The 
domestic factors do not determine the specific decisions of the government, but constrain 
the choice of viable options that the government can make. The specific factions within the 
coalition aspire to become the determinants for the government‟s policy, that is to limit the 
power that other coalition partners can have on the decisions taken. To do that, they seek to 
increase their own bargaining power, either by increasing the share of seats they have that 
support the coalition in the legislature, or by positioning themselves so their influence on 
the cabinet‟s decisions is unproportionally large. While this approach gets around the 
problem of specifically measuring the domestic impact, it limits the explanatory power of 
concrete claims. 
To summarize, the theoretical framework has been as following. The domestic 
actors have an effect on the state‟s foreign policy. These actors consist of various political 
groups within the society, but ultimately they are represented by the state‟s government. If 
this government is a coalition, it is, furthermore, divided internally into factions, with each 
faction looking to increase its power.
63
 The end goal for the leadership is to retain power. 
In a case of a protracted conflict, the achievement of this goal is aided by using conflict-
sustaining acts to enhance the need to keep the existing leadership in charge as protectors 
of the nation. Thus, protracting the conflict is a means for ensuring their own power if the 
alternative might result in overthrowing the government. The ruling elite uses the 
international level as an arena where they can project their power. The international level 
also constrains the actions that the government can take, but unless in an international 
crisis situation, the government is more concerned with the domestic arena because that is 
where their power is based.  
The interaction between the public and the leadership in producing policy outcomes 
is not straightforward. The direction and the strength of the public opinion is dependent on 
the structure of it, the leadership's own preferences, and the leaders' sensitivity to audience 
costs. Leaders have three basic strategies to counter opposition to their actions in foreign 
policy: accommodation, discreditation and mobilization, and insulation. Hagan does not 
discuss the use of two or three at the same time because he is considering the overall effect 
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of domestic politics in foreign policy. However, his ideas do not rule it out as the 
opposition can emerge from various sources and vary in strength. 
The domestic approach theory, as outlined in this chapter, leads to a number of 
questions. The first one concerns the interrelated role of objectives, perceptions, and 
decisions. As a model, one can draw the causal chain of moving from the objectives of the 
state to the perceptions of the people to the decisions of the leadership, but in a specific 
case study, when factions within the leadership have different views over the optimal 
policy, the question of what should be included in the model is not as clear-cut.  
A connected but separate question concerns the dynamic between the public 
opinion and the government‟s actions. This produces a chicken and the egg question over 
the direction of causality, with most applicable answer being “both each other at the same 
time”, and the question over the extent that these views are reflected in the decision-
making. The impact of public opinion is clear by the claim that the cabinet is unlikely to 
take up initiatives that are opposed by the majority of their constituency. The latter 
assertion is the usual notion in the theory, and this paper is not refuting it. However, party 
politics can also produce a situation where a majority of the population is supporting a 
certain outcome, but internal political contestation does not allow it to be realized.  
The basic premise of the thesis is that the state's actions in international affairs are 
embedded in domestic politics. However, as the case indicates, the actions in foreign 
policy can also have unintended effects in the domestic sphere, when the effective use of 
the strategies mentioned before has far-reaching consequences at the domestic level. 
Accommodating to and bargaining among the coalition partners can empower the groups 
with radical views. These are the spoilers in the peace process, but their role is not 
contained to foreign policy. Rather, they gain strength to impose their demands to the 
society as a whole. Discrediting the opposition makes resistance to the government‟s 
actions seem illegitimate, if not traitorous. Insulation can give the leadership free rein to do 
as they wish without oversight. These are all extreme examples that require that the ruling 
elite achieves complete success in their strategies. However, they point to the direction of 
the effect.  
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The use of accommodating strategies can be observed by seeing the implications of 
bargaining and controversy avoidance within the coalition in order to avoid the toppling of 
the government. This could take the form of one coalition partner pressuring for their 
issue, and others yielding even if the demand does not advance their interests. The less 
there are available options for the formateur of the coalition, the more it has to look for 
compromises with the junior partners. The more it gives in to radical elements, the stronger 
they become, thus narrowing the options available even more. Controversy avoidance can 
lead to inaction in face of impending threats, forcing the senior party into a corner.  
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2 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses an exploratory single case study design. It is grounded on the 
theoretical framework of domestic constraints and influence on the foreign policy of a state 
in the case of a protracted conflict. The aim of this thesis is to explore the protraction of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's second governing 
period, from 2009 to 2019, and to use this case to assess gaps in the theoretical literature.  
The choice for an exploratory research design was made due to the limited scope of 
this paper. This limitation is made explicitly evident because the case under question lasts 
ten years and would require close insights into the decision-making process in Israel's 
government to control for all possible variables. Nevertheless, the analysis provided in the 
empirical chapters uses a thorough examination of sources to provide preliminary 
explanation for Israel‟s policy towards the Palestinians and the implications it has for the 
Israeli society. 
The reasoning for case selection is following. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an 
example of a protracted conflict that has a great impact on the domestic social life of the 
nations involved in it. It is also an internationalized conflict, i.e. it involves a high degree 
of secondary international actors among states and international organizations, and the 
Jewish and the Palestinian diasporas. The period under question can to some extent be 
divided into two phases, with the beginning of the President Donald Trump‟s 
administration in the United States as the turning point. The first phase is characterized by 
a higher American pressure for Israel and Palestine to reach a settlement, the second less 
so. In both phases, hower, domestic factors prevailed in maintaining control over the scope 
of the peace process. Thus, Israel/Palestine presents a case where there has historically 
been an international pressure for conflict resolution, and nevertheless due to domestic 
factors it has not occurred.  
Because the conflict is closely present in the lives of the nations, it offers a case 
where the policy conducted by the government is expected to be under thorough 
scrutinization and interest by the constituency. Thus the domestic political impact on the 
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leadership‟s action is considered to be strong. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
marginalization of the Palestinian issue that has occurred under Netanyahu‟s rule has 
brought about widespread apathy. The Israelis are concerned with the security threats, but 
the impasse in the negotiations and the durability of the conflict has resulted in fatigue, 
where, despite rockets from Gaza and terror attacks originating from the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem, the general public is not demanding a change in the policy course.  
The period under examination considers the parliamentary elections between 2009 
and 2019, and consists of the second, third, and fourth Netanyahu governments. 
Netanyahu‟s rise to the prime minister‟s office did not happen in isolation, thus preceding 
events are taken into account when necessary. At the time of writing, Netanyahu has been 
appointed to form his fifth government, but it is yet to be presented, thus the empirical 
chapters end with the expectations about this process. The length of Netanyahu‟s power is 
unusual compared to previous Prime Ministers, hence offering a case where the effects of 
political contestation in the coalition under the lead of a same prime minister can be 
examined over time.  
This thesis uses qualitative analysis, supplementing it with public opinion data 
when appropriate. The research relies on primary sources, such as election results and 
coalition documents, secondary sources, such as scholarly articles and NGO reports, and 
articles in the Israeli and international media. These sources provide a rich examination of 
the case study. 
The primary subjects of research are parties, especially those that are in the 
coalition as they are holding the executive power in the government. In particular, the 
study focuses on the leaders of the parties. This is justified because leaders have larger 
power in politics than regular members of the parliament, especially in the highly 
personalised politics of Israel. In Israel, ministers in the government are also members of 
the parliament (members of the Knesset, MK), if they are so elected. Thus, the connection 
between the cabinet and the Knesset is close. Therefore, this thesis uses power in the 
Knesset and power in the coalition interchangeably.  
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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is termed as protracted conflict,
64
 or intractable 
conflict,
65
 or enduring rivalry.
66
 This type of conflict is identified by its extended duration 
over time, in which violence is frequently used against the adversary, and its significance 
in the politics and lives of the peoples involved.
67
 The narrow conceptualization of this 
conflict defines two states as the primary conflict parties. The Palestinian side does not 
adhere to this notion. However, the conflict is being played out between two nations and 
the Palestinian National Authority (PA) has been recognized by Israel as being the 
representative of the Palestinian people. Therefore, for all practical purposes it fulfills the 
basic criteria of a prolonged interstate conflict.
68
 
It is also an asymmetrical conflict, because the parties involved have vast 
difference in their power relative to each other. The territories of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip are claimed by State of Palestine. The control in the West Bank is divided 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) by specific area types. Gaza Strip is de 
facto governed by Hamas, a Palestinian organization considered as a terrorist group by 
Israel. Both territories are internationally seen as being under Israeli occupation,
69
 together 
with East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, territories that Israel has in practice annexed.
70
 
The West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem are legally termed as the occupied 
Palestinian territories, shortened to occupied territories in this thesis. Thus, Israel has 
extended their control to the territories claimed by Palestine. This control gives Israel an 
upper hand in the negotiations. 
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For conceptualizing the different factors within the domestic setting, Mintz and 
DeRouen Jr divide them to four categories of determinants: the decision environment, 
psychological factors, international factors, and domestic influences.
71
 Out of all four, this 
thesis focuses on domestic influences, conceptualizing it within coalition politics. The 
reasoning to disregard other determinants, although it limits the soundness of conclusions, 
is as following. A thorough research of individual psychological assessment of main actors 
in Israeli politics is not feasible to the author of this paper due to a lack of access and a 
language barrier. Environmental aspects, such as the stress of time and a lack of 
information are taken as given, as it is difficult to measure their impact in the decision-
making process. Furthermore, while the timing of events is important and has 
consequences for policy-making, dwelling on the what-if's does not take into account that 
these factors are often out of actors' control.  
A similar argument can be made for international factors. Developments in the 
international sphere have great influence on what is seen as the best action in foreign 
policy and conflict resolution, especially in such a internationalized conflict as the Israeli-
Palestinian one. For the scope of this paper, however, these events are left aside unless 
they are significantly reflected in the Israeli part of the conflict dynamic, as the state 
leadership mainly responds to, not leads these developments. This thesis does not deny that 
the internal affairs of the PA and the international factors have had an influence on 
decision-making in the Israeli government or on the peace negotiations broadly. As 
mentioned before, Israel has been able to establish its terms on their Palestinian 
counterparts. Therefore, the focus on the internal political contestation in Israel is justified.  
As explained in the theoretical framework, the domestic influences are a broader 
category than the formation of a government. Roughly, these can be distinguished between 
the government‟s actions and trends in the Israeli society. Because they are mutually 
reinforcing each other, the role of one cannot be analysed separately from the other. This 
thesis is focusing on the role of the government as an agent of decision-making. Even if 
demographic trends, such as increased religiosity and younger people having more hardline 
stances point to declining interest in implementing a two state solution, in a modern state 
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there is a government who is enforcing these views. Therefore taking shifts in public 
opinion into account is important, but by themselves they do not explain the lack of 
progress in peace negotiations. 
From its definement as an interstate conflict, it follows that Israel‟s actions towards 
the Palestinian entities can be considered as a type of foreign policy. It is closely linked to 
Israel‟s security policy or conflict management. Thus it involves more domestic issues than 
Israel‟s relations with other states. However, it can be distinguished from domestic policy. 
The distinction between a foreign and a domestic policy lies in their orientation. A certain 
foreign policy initiative can have domestic audience as its primary target group, but if that 
policy is at least partly directed to a sphere that is outside state's own domestic political 
system, it is considered to be foreign policy.
72
 Hence, this thesis uses concepts of foreign 
policy theoretization in regard to the developments between Israel and Palestine.  
These developments are changes in the conflict situation. Development does not 
necessarily entail positive or major shifts in Israeli-Palestinian relations. A change can 
occur both suddenly or gradually over time. On the Israeli side, the parliamentary elections 
constitute critical junctures in which the nation had a choice in deciding between 
alternative options in how the government conducts foreign policy. These junctures were a 
result of the events that occurred during the election cycle, thus the empirical research 
considers the events between the elections and in particular during the election campaign 
as factors for explaining the outcome of the elections. A certain baseline is taken as given, 
that is the research assumes some set of electoral power for a party based on its previous 
results and only explains the result if it considerably differs from it.  
The operationalization is based on the processes of forming of a new coalition and 
the subsequent political contestation within the coalition, where factions are using their 
bargaining power to present demands to the other parties in the coalition to pass the policy 
proposals in their interest. „Bargaining power‟ uses both the size of the share of seats the 
party holds in the Knesset and its position in relations with other coalition partners to 
measure the influence the party has in the coalition. It is a fuzzy variable, because only the 
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first element can be expressed with a precise numerical value. For the second, the 
theoretical framework is used to make some premises. A party can improve its standing 
when an agreement cannot be reached without their consent, making them able to 
disproportionately influence both the content and the adoption of a proposal. In usual 
circumstances, this power is situated in the hands of a pivotal actor or largest faction in the 
coalition. However, when parties are using the threat of internally collapsing the coalition 
unless their demands are met, they can convince other members to support these demands.  
The peace process refers to a broad effort for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. In the governmental level, this occurs through negotiations between the conflict 
parties. The two-state solution is taken to be the end goal for these negotiations, as 
envisaged in the Oslo Accords, or Oslo process. For this reason, support for two-state 
solution or support for the peace process is used interchangeably. 
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3 EMPIRICAL CASE 
3.1 Implications of foreign policy conduct 
The empirical analysis section is divided into two subchapters. 
The first subchapter examines the internal political dynamics of Israel that create a 
background under which circumstances the foreign policy is carried out and the reasons 
why the paralysis in conflict resolution is dangerous for the Israeli society. Next, the 
chapter explores the peace negotiation strategy under the leadership of Netanyahu, and 
accommodating and discrediting strategies that the government has used to consolidate 
their power. 
The second subchapter analyses the elections, formation of the coalitions, and 
relevant events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dynamic in chronological order. 
3.1.1 Case overview and analysis 
The Arab-Israeli conflict is among the most enduring conflicts today. The core 
dispute lies between the Israelis and the Palestinians, two nations who aspire for self-
determination in a limited territory. It has involved a multitude of primary and secondary 
actors and is multilayered, multidimensional, and multi-issue in its representation.
73
 The 
underlying causes for this struggle have been considered to be primarily ethnic, religious, 
or colonial. The fear of insecurity for Israelis and struggle for national self-determination 
for Palestinians are the principal reasons this conflict continues to be. Eisenberg and 
Caplan (2010) accredit the contest over identity and existence to the persistence of conflict, 
as "two national communities appear locked in a double-edged existential struggle". The 
narrative for both parties is similar: we are the rightful owners of this land and we are the 
righteous victim, suffering through the hands of the other.
74
  
Both nations base their claim on the land on their historical presence between the 
river and the sea, i.e. between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In 1947, the 
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United Nations adopted the Partition Plan, dividing what then was Mandatory Palestine 
into two independent states, one for Arabs and the other for Jews.
75
 This plan was never 
implemented. The current phase of the conflict between the State of Israel and Palestine, 
the latter being a political entity with limited self-governance officially represented by the 
Palestinian Authority, began in 1993 with signing of the Oslo Accords. As envisaged in the 
Accords, the peace process between Israel and Palestine should lead to establishing two 
independent states. Despite the official declarations of the representative authorities, there 
has been limited progress in achieving that goal. In contrast, there is a growing belief that 
the implementation of the two-state solution is no longer even possible.  
Drawing from the theory of war, Frieden (2016) lays out three reasons why 
countries would opt to bear the costs of a conflict rather than attempt to settle it by 
peaceful means. These are a lack of accurate information about their enemy, mutually 
exclusive demands for settlement, and a mistrust of the other party to carry out their 
political commitments. The first does not adhere to the Israeli-Palestinian case, because 
after decades of enduring conflict both sides have a clear understanding of the capabilities 
and the resolve of the other. Indivisibility might be significant, in particular over Jerusalem 
and the right of return for the Palestinians, as neither side would want to be seen giving up 
what they perceive to be their essential rights. Nevertheless, compromises for all core 
issues have been discussed. Thus, commitment problems seem to be the most significant 
obstacle for conflict resolution, as neither can be convinced that the other will carry out the 
concessions they promised.
76
 
The commitment problems are grounded on the domestic politics of both sides. 
Mistrust, a lack of political will and a myriad of spoilers have created an environment that 
is hostile for reaching a peaceful settlement. With its sheer length and salience in Israel and 
in the occupied Palestinian territories, the conflict has become a cause of protraction in 
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itself. There are a number of actors, both internal and external who have vested interests in 
the continuation of the conflict.
77
 Both sides trace their origin back to the conflict. This has 
led to the creation of a conflict mentality that hinders developments in the peace process.  
Del Sarto (2017) describes it as having produced a mentality of siege. This notion 
characterizes both parties in the conflict, but it has higher impact on Israel, as it is 
asymmetrically more powerful party vis-à-vis Palestinians and thus has more choice in its 
actions. The conflict mentality in Israel has resulted in a paradox: the politicians, security 
establishment, and the general public perceive the security situation to be weak and strong 
at the same time.  
This perception stems from the three core premises of Israel's national security. 
Firstly, it is the notion that Israel is located in a hostile strategic environment and has to 
constantly fight for its survival. Secondly, in that fight the State of Israel will always be 
David against Goliath, a weaker party against much stronger enemies. For that reason 
Israel has always seen itself as forced to be on the defense, even when they are carrying out 
offensive actions. This view has continued to persist even after several victories in wars 
and subsequent changes in their regional adversaries rhetoric of annihilating Israel. 
Thirdly, ultimately Israel cannot rely on any allies or partners, as they would be left alone 
to defend their country.
78
 
In addition to this narrative of weakness, however, Israel's military superiority has 
led to the emergence of a conflicting notion: a feeling of arrogance. The conflicting 
perceptions in the security doctrine together with the high impact of the security and 
defense establishment has shaped Israel's foreign policy to become more risk-taking and 
less efficient in conflict management.
79
 This is the second step of Brecher‟s causal chain of 
the persistence in the protracted conflicts: the perceptions that create the operational 
environment for the decision-makers. Going a step back, the discordant objective of Israel 
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is maintaining a state where the Jews are protected.
80
 Thus that operational environment is 
characterized as prioritizing security above all. It is a mindset that is willing to endure 
costly measures themselves and to impose these measures on others if that gives them 
security. The case study does not delve into these notions. However, they are necessary 
elements that create the backdrop for all decisions made in Israel‟s political arena.  
The second element that protracts the conflict are the individual and institutional 
interests that parties have, either clearly manifested or potentially implied, creating 
tensions. The result is that attempts for reaching a settlement will be faced by double 
opposition: first, the already powerful opponents who present the minimum demands that 
an agreement must meet, and second, the pressure from groups who are yet unformed or 
weak, but which would become stronger as the potential loss of benefits becomes apparent 
to the public. While various societal groups might declare their longing for peace, 
changing the situation might bring about their loss of prestige, budget, or identity. The 
costs of a settlement are far more recognized than the uncertain benefits.
81
  
Depending on the influence these forces have on the government, or how well they 
are represented within the government, they can be either constraints or determinants for 
the government‟s actions. The first group are termed spoilers in this paper. The spoilers are 
those actors that act for the failure of the peace process because they perceive peace as 
hindering their own interests. To gain ground for their positions, spoilers can play on the 
public or leaders' opinion.
82
 Spoilers are usually characterized by using violence to achieve 
their goal of undermining the peace process.
83
 Because the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process has stalled, active use of violence does not form a good conceptual tool for 
defining the spoilers for this paper. Instead, they are described as actors who are actively 
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working against any possibility of settlement. The two main groups of spoilers in Israeli 
politics are the settlers and the Ultra-Orthodox.
84
  
The second group are skeptical towards peace process. They might become spoilers 
if their interests are threatened. In contrast with the spoilers, these actors could be won 
over to supporting a settlement if their concerns are addressed or they are persuaded by 
incentives. A significant segment of the Israeli public are sceptics. These are the people 
who do not support the two state solution because they do not perceive it as viable option. 
They do not have an ideological stance against the two state solution, but a pragmatic one, 
and their views can be changed by increasing the likelihood of its success. Nearly 30% of 
Israeli opponents would alter their position if the leadership endorsed the peace agreement. 
In addition, various tangible and intangible incentives can be used to raise their support.
85
 
Lintl (2016) describes the locked in situation regarding the conflict and its 
settlement as an uncomfortable dilemma between principles and politics. "Whilst a 
majority of Knesset members argues in favor of a two-state settlement at least in principle, 
the party-political constellation only produces coalitions that work against it."
86
 This is not 
to say that most members of the Knesset are active proponents of establishing two states in 
the foreseeable future. Like the Israeli public, they are cautiously supportive of the idea on 
the basis that there exists no other viable option with higher support. One unified 
democratic state would put the Jewish character of Israel under question. In 2018 19% of 
Israeli Jews supported that option. Annexation without full rights to Palestinians stood at 
15%, and expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank at 8% among Jews. Both ways 
would put an end to Israel's democracy. 16% of Jews opposed any offered solution,
87
 and 
this seems to be the preferred course of action for almost all Israeli governments.  
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The main reason for lack of support is lack of belief in the feasibility of the two-
state solution or any other process.
88
 But the alternatives do not align with Israel‟s 
principles either. Israeli statesmen have never clarified how the two underlying principles 
of the state, of being Jewish and being democratic, fit together when a discrepancy 
between the two becomes salient. The right-wing governments, by and large in power 
since 1977, have emphasized the Jewish character, with Ultra-Orthodox parties securing 
the role of religion in public matters, and nationalist parties enforcing ethnic demands. This 
is representative of the public, with right-wing voters attributing more importance to the 
Jewish component, left-wing to democracy, and center split between choosing democracy 
and both equally.
89
  
Left and right in Israel‟s context do not refer to socio-economic issues, but to 
positions on security and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with right-wing being more 
hawkish and left-wing more dovish. It must be taken into account that all of Israel's leaders 
have assumed that the whole land of Mandatory Palestine is theirs. The difference in 
mentality between the right- and left wing mainstream was described by Yitzhak Rabin, 
the leader of the Labor party in the 1990s: while Likud would not be willing to give up on 
any territory, Labor would part with some if it gave Israel peace.
90
 However, the case is not 
as simple, because in addition to Rabin and the Declaration of Principles signed by him, 
two other prime ministers that have withdrawn from Israeli-held territories have come from 
right-wing, namely Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon. 
After the collapse of the Oslo process, the Israeli governments have been eroding 
the chances for a successful settlement. In particular this is clear with the premiership of 
Benjamin Netanyahu, incumbent since 2009. Back then, he started in a position where the 
majority of public was supportive of holding peace negotiations, the party that had ran on 
the very same position - Kadima - had won the largest share of of seats in the Knesset and 
the international actors were putting pressure on Israel and Palestine to come to an 
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agreement. Netanyahu‟s own views on the matter are inconclusive, but he has always been 
more of a pragmatic than an idealistic leader. From 2010, the government and the public 
have been moving further from reaching a settlement. As explained, a considerable share 
of the population is inclined to change their mind if there is a political will for peace 
process. Thus, the decline in the support reflects the decline in the political will in the 
government. 
The marginalization of the Palestinian issue in the electoral campaigns has worn 
down the alternative vision that the mainstream left can offer, with perceived vulnerability 
in regards to security this has shifted the political landscape to the right. The formation of 
the right-wing coalitions has strengthened the radical groups within the government, who 
act as spoilers for any possible settlement. The right-religious bloc is not internally 
cohesive. It has been consisting of three pillars: Likud as the formateur, the secular parties, 
either formed around socio-economic issues such as Yesh Atid or Kulanu or with 
nationalist agenda such as Yisrael Beytenu, and thirdly, the religious parties: Shas and 
United Torah Judaism. A sharp dividing line between religion and secular nationalism has 
threatened to pull the bloc apart from inside, and tensions between the two camps led to the 
elections of 2013, 2015 and 2019.  
Under Netanyahu, Likud started out as a pivotal actor in the coalitions, willing to 
sit with center parties and even with Labor after 2009 elections. Gradually, the share of 
MKs who could be considered left of Likud decreased in the government.
91
 Until last year, 
the religious-nationalist Jewish Home was able to accommodate the religious and secular 
nationalism. With an internal split and subsequent merger into a United Right alliance with 
ultra-radical religious factions, the party can now be safely added to the religious camp. It 
appears that the optimal way of keeping religious and secular nationalists together has been 
to curtail all paths for finding a solution to the Palestinian question, as it has been one of 
the few issues where two camps within the bloc are in full agreement. The almost non-
existent possibility of solving the conflict now is an obvious result of that process.  
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Because the government has perceived itself to be vulnerable to overthrowal, they 
have used two strategies for countering that threat. Within the coalition, the main strategy 
has been one of accommodation. In order to cross the religious and secular line, the policy 
has not been to strengthen the power of traditionalists or find compromises, but to avoid 
making difficult decisions in the first place. In addition to the peace process, these also 
involve controversial topics surrounding the role of religion in the society. With the 
opposition in the Knesset and in the public, the government has opted for legitimizing their 
regime and discrediting the opponents as harmful to Israel‟s security.  
The resulting approach to foreign policy has waved between being assertive and 
conflictual, to discredit all domestic actors who might threaten the ruling elite's power, and 
of avoiding a grand conflict that might actually endanger Israel's security and jeopardize 
the elite's power. To achieve this equilibrium, Netanyahu and his partners have been using 
the two levels of international and domestic auditoriums. For domestic mobilization, it is 
useful to create an impression of the society that constantly has to protect itself. As 
mentioned before, the use of this tactic aligns with the dominant view of national security 
that sees Israel as being fundamentally vulnerable. However, it has also resulted in 
depicting domestic opposition, such as Israeli Arabs, the left-wing parties and NGOs, but 
also judiciary and the media as a threat to the power of the right-wing government. 
Internationally the government must avoid to be seen as willingly protracting the conflict 
too much, because it would be harmful to Israel‟s international standing.  
As a result of rising religiosity, which will be elaborated on later, and 
delegitimization of the left, is that it has become increasingly marginalized. Now, only 5% 
of Israeli Jews describe themselves as left-wing and 11% as center-left. In contrast, 33% of 
Israeli Jews call themselves right-wing and 26% center-right. 24% identify with center.
92
 
At the same time the perceived tension between the left and right on foreign policy and 
security issues has become more important throughout the 2010s. In 2012, only 9% of 
Jewish respondents named the tension between right and left as the strongest division in 
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Israeli society. 47% saw the cleavage between Jews and Arabs as being the strongest. In 
contrast, in 2016 the numbers were, respectively, 29% and 48.5%, while in 2018 the 
former had risen to 36% and the latter dropped to 28%.
93
 Thus, the internal schism 
between Jews along the line of left and right has become more salient while the share of 
population that identifies with the left-wing, as seen by electoral votes, is going down. This 
has happened while there has been no major developments in the peace process or a 
sudden setback to Israel‟s security.  
The second outcome of coalition politics is the pressure it lays on the Jewish and 
democratic principles of the state. Classifying Israel's democracy in comparative politics 
has never been a straightforward case. Often, Israel is described as an unique case or its 
distinctions from other democracies are heavily emphasized. The dynamic nature of 
Israel's political system over time adds to this complexity, with the factional system 
transforming from a dominant party to a bipolar one and ultimately into an unstable 
system. Several authors make the case of Israel as a liberal democracy that has some 
tendencies for consociational politics and certain shortcomings.
94
 A contrasting viewpoint 
sees Israel as an ethnic democracy. It takes into account that there has never been a 
separation of religion and state nor religion and ethnicity.
95
 Deep dividing lines between 
the Jews and the Israeli Arabs and the state institutions' blatant preference for the first do 
not allow it to be classified as a consociational democracy in a classical sense.
96
 
However, this model is useful in describing the relations between the secular elite 
and the Ultra-Orthodox segment of society during the first decades of Israel's 
independence. The practice was so successful in accommodating two exclusive sub-
cultures that it gave way to consensus democracy, which sets restrains to majority rule, and 
then gradually shifted to majoritarian politics. Due to the extremely proportional electoral 
system and high correlation between demographics and voting patterns, both factors which 
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help to sustain the fragmentation in politics, Israel cannot be termed as a fully majoritarian 
state.
97
 Over time, however, it has significantly moved towards majority rule, further 
entrenched by the populist politics of 2010s that seek to depict the opposition as opponents 
to the will of the people.  
Right-wing parties have been a major force in the government since 1977, when 
under the leadership of Menachem Begin, Likud won the elections and formed the 
coalition. Ultra-Orthodox parties started to gain strength in the 1980s, but in that and the 
following decade they were still willing to sit in the government with center-left parties, 
thus making the political system less locked in than it is today.
98
 The Israeli party system 
was already fragmented due to various social divisions, a low electoral threshold to the 
Knesset and a single-district closed party list electoral system. In 1996, the electoral reform 
allowed voters to cast one vote for a prime minister and another for a party of their 
choosing, which strongly strengthened the smaller parties at the expense of Labor and 
Likud, the dominant left- and right-wing parties. In addition, the majoritarian elections in 
1996 and in 1999 had a strong effect on religious parties, because they forced them to take 
sides. As religious beliefs are highly correlated with hawkish positions, almost all religious 
politicians have been openly backing the right-wing governments since.
99
 These elections 
paved the way for the emergence of an unstable party system in early 2000s, with changes 
in the party landscape after every election. In this instability, the previously more 
accommodating relations between the various segments of Israeli society have weakened. 
Israel has five major social rifts: between Jews and the minorities, mainly Arabs; 
between religious and secular people; hawks and doves regarding the conflict; Ashkenazi 
and Mizrahi; and class divisions.
100
 These rifts create identity groups with clear voting 
preferences. The Jewish-Arab ethnic animosity has historically been the sharpest split 
between Israeli citizens, its importance as a political dimension is only hindered by the fact 
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that Arab parties have never been acceptable coalition partners.
101
 The existence of social 
divisions does not mitigate conflicts in itself. However, the extremely proportional 
representation in the Knesset has inclined smaller parties to advocate only for their small 
voters‟ base and push their demands into the coalitions. This has led to sustained social 
divides. 
For example, in contrast to almost all Western democracies, the religious-secular 
rift in Israel has become a more powerful issue over time.
102
 This has been caused by 
several reasons. Firstly, due to the higher birth rate of religious people, they increasingly 
form a larger share of the population. Secondly, the traditional and moderately Orthodox 
Jews have intensified their religious commitment as a way to increase their status.
103
 The 
result of these two trends is that the share of population who thought that the public life has 
to be conducted in compliance with religious law rose from 31% in 1992 to 46% in 
2009.
104
 The growing power of religious parties have increased their demands of 
implementing their norms to other parts of the society, making the Israeli public sphere 
more religious.
105
 The perceived tension between the religious and secular Jews has made 
an U-turn. In 2012, 21% of Jewish respondents chose it as the strongest cause for tension, 
in 2015 and 2016 it had dropped to 10% and 11%, respectively, whereas in 2018 the 
segment of population that saw it to be the strongest rift had risen back to 24%.
106
 While 
left-right and secular-religious cleavages do not act as proxies to each other, there exists a 
wide overlap between the two.  
As an ethnic democracy, Israel was stable between 1966 and 2000. Before that, the 
Arab citizens were living under a military regime, thus Israel cannot be validly classified 
as democracy between 1948 and 1966. Since the beginning of the Second Intifada Israel 
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has not been able to accommodate both a liberal democracy and ethno-nationalism, as 
required by the original principles of Israel being democratic and Jewish. The mediating 
element between them was civic republicanism, a notion that the degree of rights and 
privileges an individual has before the state is dependent on that individual's contribution 
to the Zionist project. In its essence, this conception was based on solidarity, not ethnicity, 
although it did drive a wedge between the nations as Arab citizens were unlikely to be 
eager Zionists. The shift to a neoliberal economy since the mid-1980s and subsequent 
liberalization of social life eroded the stability of ethnic democracy. When Arab citizens 
tried to use the liberalized political space to expand the character of the state to include 
them as well, they ethno-national principles demanded the continuation of their exclusion. 
Therefore when the legislation before 2000 infringed on the Arab citizens' rights, it was to 
achieve some other goal, be it related to security or Jewish demographic majority. Since 
then, however, it appears that the objective of the bills has primarily been to impair their 
rights.
107
  
The backdrop for the government policies is, therefore, the salient tensions between 
ethnic groups and over religion. Both issues concern the character of the State of Israel and 
thus are of a fundamental nature, with no clear way of reconciliation as they present 
mutually exclusive demands. The democratic governance model and coalition politics have 
historically been the mechanism of accommodating different interests. In some ways, this 
has been gradually substituted with majority rule, with increased efforts to push through 
legislation that would adhere to the will of the majority, not to protect minority rights. In 
other ways, however, the coalition formation has given greater bargaining power for 
extremist factions. This has reinforced the pressure that these factions put to sustaining 
social cleavages that are crucial in maintaining their power base. 
Thus, the dilemma of Israeli politics. The conflict has made possible to uphold the 
siege mentality that is holding the Jewish Israeli society together. The longer the conflict 
goes on, however, the harder it becomes to accommodate between being Jewish and being 
democratic. The decade under Netanyahu has seen an intensified emphasis of the Jewish 
                                                          
107
 Peled, Yoav. (2014). The Challenge of Ethnic Democracy: The State and Minority Groups in Israel, 
Poland and Northern Ireland. London and New York: Routledge. Pp 147-149. 
46 
 
character of the state. At the same time, the shift in liberal-democratic norms is foreboding. 
Israeli politics operate within the context of salient tensions in the Jewish segment over 
security and religion, and between Jews and Arabs over ethnicity and nationalism. 
Baumgart-Ochse (2009) concludes that "the [Oslo] peace process was closely intertwined 
with a process of improving democratic governance in Israel".
108
 While degradation in the 
peace process does not necessarily entail the decline in liberal-democratic norms in Israel, 
the cultivation of ethnic and religious nationalism with attempts to expand the authorities 
of the government has increased the risk for it.  
 
3.1.2 Negotiation strategy under Netanyahu 
The leadership‟s actions towards the peace process most closely resemble the 
insulation strategy. This application is with provisions, as Israel's security policy is not 
isolated from its domestic policy, and in regards to the Palestinians, it might be difficult to 
distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, the Netanyahu governments have separated the 
negotiations from general foreign policy, as they aim to warm up their relations with the 
Arab states despite the plight of the Palestinians. In the domestic arena, the political 
discourse has been fixed on blaming the Palestinians for the lack of progress.  
The recognition demand, which Netanyahu has made a priority, effectively adds 
another hurdle for negotiations which are already riddled with obstacles. In using that 
strategy, the government can make use of the security mindset that has detached Israeli 
actions from the protraction of the conflict. The effective us of this tactic has led to an 
outcome in which Israelis have adjusted to the regular cycles of violence. In times when 
there has been a majority in support for establishing the two-state solution, the leadership 
has not taken it upon themselves to implement it. Since 2014, no talks have been held to 
even discuss the conditions under which Israelis and Palestinians could come to terms.  
On 14 June 2009, Netanyahu held a widely covered speech in the Bar-Ilan 
University, in which he offered his conditional support for establishing a Palestinian state. 
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In the speech, he declared that to achieve peace, Palestinians have to recognize the right of 
Israel to be a nation-state for Jews. In addition to the recognition, he added demilitarization 
as a necessary condition.
109
 This is the strongest endorsement for two-state solution that 
Netanyahu has come to. However, his demands set new conditions for the success of a 
peace process. While demilitarization had been a condition for the previous negotiations, 
with recognition Netanyahu added a requirement that demands the Palestinian Authority to 
refute Palestinian citizens of Israel. He also placed it at the top of the negotiation priorities, 
without which no negotiations can be concluded or possibly even started.
110
 The cause for 
this speech has been considered to be significant US pressure, not a change in the Prime 
Minister's views.
111
 Additionally, on 25 November, Netanyahu succumbed to the US‟ 
pressure and declared a 10-month moratorium on building settlement houses in the West 
Bank.
112
  
The joint poll conducted in June, before the speech, found that 59% of the Israeli 
population supported a two-state solution, while 36% opposed it.
113
 In December, 73% of 
Israelis supported the two-state solution; however, the question asked was about the best 
solution to the conflict.
114
 A similar poll conducted in August did not ask about general 
support, but found a minor rise in support among Israelis for the Arab Peace Initiative 
(from 36% in June to 40%) and a steady decline in support of the Clinton package to 46%, 
from 52% in December 2008.
115
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The timing and possible formulation differences in these questions hinders the 
validity of making any undisputed claims about shifts in the Israeli public‟s opinion and its 
connection with the leadership‟s actions. However, the 73% support in December and 71% 
support in March 2010
116
 is the highest support that the Israeli public has given to the two-
state solution in the last decade. Other than the Prime Minister‟s speech, there were no 
major events related to conflict resolution in Israel that could have raised the public 
support. There was, however, international pressure on Netanyahu to make progress with 
the Palestinians. In 21 August 2009 the Palestinian Authority issued a plan for building 
strong state institutions, despite the stalling of the peace process.
117
 This was met with 
scorn from some of Netanyahu‟s coalition members but support from the US.118  
Surveys indicate that even though neither the Israeli nor Palestinian public is eager 
to make compromises on any issue, when the whole peace agreement is presented as a 
peace "package" from the government, they would accept. Crucially, this occurs when the 
peace package is backed by the government.
119
 The Arab Peace Initiative has never had the 
support from the Israeli leadership, whereas the Clinton parameters were proposed during 
the eventually unsuccessful Camp David negotiations in 2000 and accepted with 
reservations.  
Despite the costs that the conflict imposes on both nations and the possibility of 
gaining a majority support in the referendum, the Israeli government has not been inclined 
to move towards the conflict resolution. Mustafa & Ghanem (2013) claim that the Israeli 
approach for settlement that has been carried out under Netanyahu did not emerge as a plan 
to wreck the peace process. Rather, it was a compromise that the Israeli right had to 
internally make to come to terms with the recognition of the PLO, long deemed as 
illegitimate, and the subsequent establishment of the PA. The State of Israel had 
acknowledged the Palestinians and the need to work with them to find a solution to the 
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conflict. Thus, the mainstream right could no longer deny the Palestinians the agency in 
the peace process. Instead, they took upon themselves the language of having no partner 
for peace in the Palestinian side, i.e. Israel is willing, but the current leadership of the PA 
makes it impossible to have any progress in the negotiations. In this vein, Netanyahu set a 
demand to recognize Israel as a Jewish state before the negotiations could progress.
120
  
The PLO officials have rejected this proposal and have indicated that Israel is using 
it as a tactical move to prolong the negotiations without showing wholehearted 
commitment.
121
 In 2015, the Palestinian chief negotiator answered to Israel‟s stances with 
declaring that that after Netanyahu's victory in the polls, there is no Israeli partner for the 
peace process.
122
 Israeli right wing has used this rejection to support their argument that 
the Palestinian side is not accepting the two-state solution.
123
 The recognition demand is 
not new, as it has been discussed in the academic literature as an obstacle to reconciliation 
between the two nations. Netanyahu has brought it into the political arena and presents it 
as a requirement to a final settlement, even though a settlement in principle does not need a 
moral acknowledgment of each other between the conflict parties.
124
  
The recognition demands offers large political benefits for the government that is 
using it. In one strike, it appeals to their voter base, who are more interested in preserving 
and promoting the Jewish character to the state, sets another obstacle for PA, which 
already has deep grievances over the losses they have had to cut, and allows to present the 
Israeli government as willing party for negotiations in the international arena. It can also 
offer a hint in regards to the perceptions that Netanyahu has about the conflict. Instead of 
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associating the 1967 war and the occupation as the causes of the perpetuation of the 
conflict, he attributes it to the very existence of the Jewish state.
125
  
The backdrop for this demand was the polarized environment for the peace 
initiatives from the 1990s. The negotiations of 1990s and early 2000s had broken several 
taboos of the Israeli right, such as acquiescing, if not exactly admitting Israel‟s part in the 
Palestinian Nakba and the ensuing refugee crisis.
126
 At the same time, the Oslo Accords 
were a peril to the settlement movement, which became afraid of losing its power and the 
foundation of the power at the same time.
127
 Gagnon identifies it as one of the first 
conditions of when a ruling elite is willing to impose costly measures to retain their 
power.
128
  
Throughout Netanyahus‟s premiership these views have transformed into a wide 
campaign that accuses the PLO of delegitimizing Israel. This was a response to a 
diplomatic initiative that the PLO had started in 2011 with the objective of becoming a full 
member in the United Nations which would grant the State of Palestine the international 
recognition it seeks. US is expected to veto such proposals in the Security Council, thus the 
Palestinian proposal was intended to gain international attention to the Palestinian cause 
but by that time the Western audience was fatigued of the matter and the Arab states were 
occupied with their internal matters.
129
 Furthermore, the PA looked to gain some political 
leverage in relations with Israel that would force the Israelis to come to negotiations with 
more equitable terms.
130
  
Israel swiftly rejected this plan, but as a response to this initiative together with 
proposed resolutions in the UN, which demand action on the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
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process, and the reinforced Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement they 
increased their delegitimation attacks to ensure that their positions prevail in the 
international domain.
131
 Falk (2014) describes the current phase of Palestinian national 
movement and Israel's descriptions of it as a "delegitimation project" or "lawfare" as a turn 
towards the legitimacy struggle, in which both parties use the domestic and international 
arena to claim that the other is victimizing them.
132
 After gaining their status as an 
observer state, the PA suspended their efforts for a while, until in late 2018 they announced 
that they are again seeking to hold a vote in the Security Council on the matter of their 
sovereignty.
133
 In February 2019, Israel did not grant permission for the Security Council 
to pay a visit to the West Bank, declaring it to be a part of international Palestinian 
propaganda.
134
 
 
3.1.3 Accommodating settlers 
The Jews have been settling in the occupied territories following the 1967 war. 
While all Israeli civilian settlements in the territories are illegal under the international law, 
most of the settlement blocs have been authorized by the Israeli government. In addition, 
some one hundred outposts have been built. These are the settlements that are illegal under 
Israeli law as well, even though the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) sometimes provide them 
with security.
135
 In the Knesset the settlers have been mainly represented by the Jewish 
Home, a party most keen on expanding the Israeli sovereignty to the West Bank. By the 
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wishes of this party the government has been attempting to retroactively legalize these 
outposts. The leadership‟s approach towards the settlers is represented by accommodating 
their interests within the coalition with their representatives. This strategy has resulted in 
undermining the peace process, as the settlers constitute the strongest spoilers for 
implementing the two-state solution. It has also made Israeli rule of law more fragile.  
Israeli settlers warrant attention because they are the most visible way how Israel is 
expanding the magnitude of spoilers. While all other final status issues are contentious in 
themselves and both parties present mutually exclusive demands, an agreement about them 
could, at least theoretically, be reached between the two sides around the negotiating table 
and implemented by two governments. With the settlements, the people on the ground are 
likely to fight against the implementation of any such agreement, possibly by using 
violence.  
The sheer number of settlements in the West Bank has made the evacuation of all 
settlements on Palestinian land to be in practice impossible, and even from just a few 
would be very difficult. While swapping the Green Line settlements for some uninhibited 
Israeli land is a feasible option, in order to establish territorial continuity for a Palestinian 
state, some evacuation is necessary. The settlers who are living in these settlements and 
outposts are the most zealous members of the movement, already making it difficult to 
convince them to leave. The settlers have also been promoting like-minded people to work 
in the bureaucracy and gain positions in the army, thus potentially obstructing the 
implementation of any evacuation plan.
136
 
Before 2010s, the settlers had opted for establishing facts on the ground rather than 
gaining electoral power, because Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon disengaging from 
Israeli-controlled land had proven to them that even right-wing politicians are not 
trustworthy supporters of the settlers. In the past decade they started gaining more electoral 
representation in the Knesset as well.
137
 This is not to say that previous Israeli 
governments, both right- and left-wing, have been less than sympathetic towards settlers, 
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even if their actions have been illegal under the Israeli law. But the right-bloc‟s 
dependence in the coalition-formation on the Jewish Home, and United Right now, 
together with hardliners in Likud, have spearheaded their influence in the political arena.  
In similar fashion to the previous Israeli governments, Netanyahu has promoted 
settlement construction in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank. He has advanced this 
policy further than most, however. The settlements in the West Bank fall into two 
categories based on their location: either near the Green Line, as in the settlement blocs, or 
in isolated locations deep in the West Bank, on the other side of the Separation Wall. 
While both are illegal under international law, the first category has been considered as a 
possible option for a land swap under a peace agreement. The isolated settlements are built 
with the intention of settling in Judea and Samaria, of building physical obstacles to the 
congruity of any Palestinian entity.  
40% of the construction permissions that the second Netanyahu government 
approved of were in isolated settlements, contrary to 20% in previous years. In addition to 
granting new construction rights, the governments have made use of retroactively 
legalizing the outposts that even the Israeli law deems illegal. Similarly, the intensity of 
construction planning in East Jerusalem and the sensitivity of some locations shows a 
support for settlement expansion that is considerably higher than in the previous 
governments.
138
 By 2018, this figure rose to 70%. At least 11% of construction have 
occurred in the illegal outposts. Published tenders for construction have also reached 
record highs under Netanyahu. According the the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 18 
500 new housing units were built between 2009 and 2017,
139
 with a jump in the 
construction permits issued in 2013
140
 and an increase in spending on settlement 
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infrastructure in 2017.
141
 Altogether this added 120 000 new settlers, bringing the number 
of Israelis living in the West Bank to nearly 450 000 (2018) and in East Jerusalem to 210 
000 (2016).
142
 At the same time, the growth rate in the West Bank settlements has been 
gradually declining for a decade, from an annual rate of 5% to 3%.
143
  
Settling in illegal outposts, on the 'hilltops', became increasingly blatant during 
Netanyahu's first premiership and was then halted in 2005. In 2012, this phenomenon 
returned, although in comparatively smaller numbers that in the 1990s and early 2000s.
144
 
Israel's Supreme Court had ordered to dismantle these outposts, to which the government 
answered with starting to retroactively legalizing them.
145
 In 2015, the Jewish Home 
reportedly asked for a plan to move forward with the legalization process as part of their 
coalition demands.
146
 In the next year, a ministerial committee unilaterally agreed to a 
legislation that retroactively legalized over 4000 settlement buildings,
147
 and in early 2017 
this was passed in the Knesset.
148
 
The trouble with illegal outposts had become evident in late 2016, when the 
deadline issued by the Supreme Court to dismantle Amona approached. Netanyahu issued 
a video statement, pleading the Amona settlers to refrain from using violence against the 
evacuation. He also stated that the government is increasing their efforts to fight against 
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illegal housing in all Israel, a clear reference to the Arab districts.
149
 After meeting with the 
Amona settlers, the government convinced them to relocate to another outpost nearby, a 
move that was widely criticized as yielding to people that had broken the Israeli law.
150
 In 
2017, Netanyahu approved establishing a new settlement site in the West Bank, becoming 
the first Israeli prime minister since Oslo accords to grant such permission.
151
 He justified 
that he was upholding the promises he had made to Amona settlers.
152
 The new permission 
and the retroactive legalization were parts of the accommodation strategy to secure the 
support of the settlers within the coalition and in the public. 
The Regulation law, as it is shortly known, was referred to the Supreme Court by 
several human rights NGOs.
153
 In August 2017, the Court issued an interim order to 
suspend its enforcement.
154
 The defense minister Lieberman stated that Regulation law is 
sabotaging the settlement movement because it would give chances for Palestinians to 
legalize their own illegal houses. At the same time, he stated that he would agree for a 
legislation that bans violent settlers of the outposts from the West Bank.
155
 The attorney 
general, who has been opposing the legislation on the grounds that it is unconstitutional 
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and violates the Palestinians' rights, has recommended the government to look for 
alternative legal measures for regulating the outposts.
156
  
A similar legislation, which addressed 66 outposts, was approved in the ministerial 
committee for legislation in late 2018, with the Jewish Home threatening to bring the 
coalition to collapse if it is not passed.
157
 This initiative would authorize the outposts 
temporarily and give the state two years to decide on their status. Within that two years 
these outposts cannot be demolished and the government has to provide them municipal 
services. Because both of these clauses are already in practice fulfilled, the proposal was 
symbolic, but with an implied intention to press the government to resolve the quarrel with 
the Supreme Court.
158
 Thus far, the bill has not been put on a vote in the Knesset and its 
main proponents were not elected back to the Knesset. However, the disagreement between 
the government and the Supreme Court continues.  
 
3.1.3 Legislation 
Some of the legislation passed or attempted to pass during Netanyahu‟s governance 
demonstrate the strategy of discrediting the opposition and legitimising the regime. The 
use of this strategy will be discussed only briefly, because these tactics have been directed 
primarily to the domestic level and have less salient links to foreign policy. However, they 
erosion of the left-wing‟s credibility has resulted in establishing a frame that the current 
leadership‟s hawkish but apathetic policy towards the Palestinian issue is the only possible 
stance. This is best demonstrated with comparing the rivals to Netanyahu in 2009 and 
2019: in the former, Tzipi Livni was running on the platform of negotiating with the 
Palestinians, in the latter Benny Gantz was a Chief of Staff during the 2014 operation in 
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Gaza and in the election campaign declared that in the Palestinian side there is no one to 
talk to.
159
  
Since 2009, the coalition parties have launched an effort to shape the legislation in 
ways that have been described by Gorenberg (2011) as going against basic democratic 
principles. “That offensive, I must stress, faced resistance within the Knesset and in the 
general public. Nonetheless, the tidal wave of legislation aimed against the Arab minority, 
human rights activists, and critics of the occupation was unprecedented.”160 
For example, in 2009, Yisrael Beytenu ran on the platform of sowing mistrust 
towards the Arab citizens of Israel. They used the slogan 'no loyalty, no citizenship' and 
promised to install loyalty tests to non-Jewish citizens of Israel to gauge whether they are 
worthy of the citizenship. This test would bestow certain civil rights, such as voting, 
running in the elections, working for the state, identity cards, and citizenship only to those 
who give the oath which acknowledges Israel's Jewish, democratic, and Zionist nature.
161
 
A proposal that required only new citizens to pledge loyalty to the state on Jewish and 
democratic terms was passed in the cabinet in 2010, but it has not been taken to the 
Knesset floor.
162
 
Of those that have been passed, Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority 
Rights in Israel counts 26 discriminatory laws for the period of 2010-2017, compared to 14 
in the 2000s and less than 5 for decades before it.
163
 The numbers do not reflect the content 
of these bills and thus do not measure the extent that they infringe on the Arab citizens' 
rights. Therefore it only offers a rough comparison. However, the adopted legislation 
shows signs of using normal governance procedures for a process that ultimately 
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securitizes the government's policy preferences. With that move, otherwise political 
questions are raised out of the realm of politics to represent existential matters.
164
  
The ongoing dispute with the Supreme Court over the constitutionality of the 
legalization of outposts has also increased the attempts to bring it under political control. 
Ayelet Shaked, who served as a Minister of Justice in the 2015 government, pushed for 
reforms in the judiciary system that would limit the authority of the Supreme Court by 
stripping it of the power to oversee the Knesset's legislation, while giving the parliament 
the right to appoint judges.
165
 These reforms failed to gain a majority support because of 
Kulanu blocking the initiatives.
166
 Before the elections, it was reported that Kulanu is 
considering to stop opposing the coalition partners in the new government.
167
 With Shaked 
and Bennett failing to cross the threshold, it is unknown if the proposal will be carried 
forward.  
In July 2018, the Knesset adopted the Basic Law of Israel as the Nation-State of the 
Jewish People, a law enshrining Israel as the national home for the Jews.
168
 The origins of 
the bill trace back to 2011, when it was first proposed as a basic law. In 2017, a special 
joint committee for discussing the law was established, and after extensive debates in the 
Knesset and in the public it was passed with 62 favorable votes against 55. Before the 
legislation went into second and third reading, Israel's President Reuven Rviin criticized it 
harshly as harmful to the Jewish people by allowing communities to establish separate 
communal settlements and thus permit discrimination. The bill's original sponsor, Avi 
Dichter, who had moved from Kadima to Likud, defended the bill as protecting the 
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majority rights.
169
 Subsequently, the language was softened to state promoting the 
development of Jewish communities.
170
  
The adoption of the law was largely symbolic, with the coalition boasting that it is 
a defining moment in the annals of Zionism and the opposition warning of impairing the 
relations between Israeli Jews and Arabs.
171
 Livni lamented that she had insisted on adding 
the clause of committing to the equality for all its citizens, but it had been rejected by the 
coalition because they were not even interested in gaining the support from the 
opposition.
172
 Netanyahu rejected the inclusion of such clause because civil rights are 
enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
173
 The EU voiced its concern 
over adopting the law as it would further complicate the implementation of the two-state 
solution.
174
 Whereas the law itself has more declaratory that actual effect, it is representing 
the trend in which the legislation is increasingly directed at consolidating the majority‟s 
rights. 
 
3.2 Election cycles 
In the second subchapter the parliamentary elections of 2009, 2013, 2015, and 
2019, and the events during the election cycles are analyzed to assess the changes in the 
government formation that have brought about the strategies presented before. Election 
results are referred in appendix 2.  
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3.2.1 Elections in 2009: Kadima wins, but Likud forms the government 
The 2009 parliamentary elections in February were preceded by Operation Cast 
Lead against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The military campaign followed a near-total closure 
on Gaza in the first two weeks of December 2008, to which Hamas responded with a 
declaration that they would not renew the truce that had, with some infringements, held in 
effect since summer 2008. The Palestinian rocket fire was responded with an Israeli air 
campaign, followed by a ground invasion.
175
 In January 18, Israel declared to implement 
an unilateral ceasefire after gaining security pledges from Egypt and the US. Hamas 
responded with their own cease-fire at the same day.
176
 
The immediate effect of the military operation on the elections was diminishing the 
attention paid by the Israeli public. All leading parties had chosen their prime minister 
candidates,
177
 but up until the end of the operation there had been no public debates 
between them.
178
 During the operation, all parties froze their election campaigns.
179
 When 
the dust settled and the political campaign became prominent again, security was 
reinforced as the central issue. Likud had used the rallying around the flag tactic 
throughout the operation. Now they shifted back to attacking Tzipi Livni‟s capabilities and 
willingness to crush Israel‟s enemies.180 In general, the parties' campaign agendas 
primarily included security issues, such as terrorism, attacks and intifada. Altogether 28% 
of campaign videos addressed the security questions, compared to 23% of videos about 
socio-economic issues and 6% of videos about negotiations with the Palestinians.
181
  
                                                          
175
 Prelude to Operation Cast Lead Israel's Unilateral Disengagement to the Eve of War. (2009). Journal of 
Palestine Studies, 38(3), pp. 139-168. DOI: 10.1525/jps.2009.xxxviii.3.139. Pp 164-168. 
176
 Esposito, Michele K. (2009). Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy: 16 November 2008–15 
February 2009. Journal of Palestine Studies, 38(3), pp. 286-319. DOI: 10.1525/jps.2009.xxxviii.3.286. P 295. 
177
 Tzipi Livni for Kadima, Benyamin Netanyahu for Likud, and Ehud Barak for Labor.  
178
 Esposito 2009: 299. 
179
 Rahat; Gideon; Hazan Reuven Y. (2009). One Winner, Two Winners, No Winners: The 2009 Elections in 
Israel. Representation, 45(4), pp. 405-420, DOI: 10.1080/00344890903236981. P 408. 
180
 Gerstenfeld, Manfred. (2010). The run-up to the elections: a political history of the 2009 campaign. Israel 
Affairs, 16(1), pp. 14-30. Pp 22-23. 
181
 Tsfati, Yariv; Sheafer, Tamir; Weimann, Gabriel. (2011). War on the Agenda: The Gaza Conflict and 
Communication in the 2009 Elections. In The Elections in Israel 2009, Arian, Asher; Shamir, Michal (eds). 
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp. 225-250. P 233. 
61 
 
The Israeli Jewish public strongly supported the operation and was suspicious of 
the Palestinians. This sentiment carried on to the elections. On January 12, Israel's Central 
Elections Committee banned two Arab parties from running in the elections on the request 
of the extreme right Yisrael Beytenu party and the National Union-National Religious 
Party. The Supreme Court overturned this decision on January 21.
182
 In the run-up to 
elections, Netanyahu took hard-line positions on the settlements and Hamas, and opposed 
the creation of a Palestinian state.
183
  
The average weekly polls gave similar support to both the ruling center-left 
government and the opposing right-religious bloc. As Hamas continued with limited 
retaliations after the cease-fire, the most hawkish parts of the electorate, those who had 
been supporting the government during the operation, returned to right. This gave the 
right-wing some advantage in the polls. Within the blocs, however, left-wing Labor and 
right-wing Yisrael Beytenu gained support in the expense of front-runners Kadima and 
Likud, respectively, as these parties successfully used the military operation to mobilize 
their supporters.
184
 The success of smaller parties continued in the news coverage, with 
Yisrael Beytenu's loyalty oath pledge becoming much more central issue in the news than 
with the public.
185
  
As the gap between the blocs increased before the elections and parties were 
unlikely to get voters from across the aisle just before the election, they tried to secure the 
vote in their own bloc, rather than gaining them from the other side. Kadima launched a 
last minute campaign to encourage left-wing voters to strategically vote for Tzipi Livni, 
instead of Labor and Meretz. This tactic proved to be successful, as Kadima did gain most 
votes in the elections, winning 28 seats in the expense of smaller left-wing parties. 
However, this also demonstrated that Kadima had predicted the overall victory for right-
religious bloc and tried to gain more leverage for bargaining with them. Both Livni and 
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Netanyahu had supported forming a national unity government between Kadima and 
Likud, so the decisive struggle was over the prime minister‟s seat.186 
Although Likud had received one seat less in the Knesset than Kadima, the right-
religious bloc had a majority of 65 seats, of which Likud held 27. In net shift, the right 
received 15 more seats than in the 2006 elections. The four religious parties all lost a seat 
each to Likud. Yisrael Beytenu, launched in 1999 as a splinter from Likud, focusing on 
new immigrants from Russia, became the third largest party by expanding its electoral base 
with nationalist voters.
187
 Instead of forming a national unity government with Kadima, 
Netanyahu included Labor in his coalition. Therefore the 32nd government of Israel started 
with 5 parties and 30 ministers:
188
 Likud (27 MKs), Yisrael Beytenu (15), Labor (13), Shas 
(11), The Jewish Home (3).
189
 In terms of ministerial posts, this was an exceptionally large 
cabinet, suggesting the use of side-payments to gain support.  
By excluding Kadima, the forming of this coalition does not adhere to the size 
principle and the policy distance principle. In both security and religious dimensions, 
center-Kadima and center-hawkish Likud were closer to each other than more dovish and 
secular Labor to Likud, even more so if comparing Labor to religious and nationalist 
coalition members.
190
 There were two controversial demands made by Kadima that 
resulted in their exclusion. First, Kadima insisted on the rotation of the prime minister's 
seat. The negotiator for Kadima claimed that Netanyahu was prepared to agree to that, but 
the deadlock emerged over the issue of negotiations with the Palestinians, which Livni 
wanted to continue from the terms reached in Annapolis in 2007.
191
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Netanyahu was hesitant to form a narrow government, after having seen one fall 
apart under the competing demands of smaller parties in the late 1990s.
192
 For widening 
the government and to exclude the extreme right-wing National Union, Netanyahu 
approached Ehud Barak, even though a majority of Labor MKs were against of joining the 
coalition. To gain their support, Netanyahu offered a payment of five ministerial 
appointments, raising Labor to same level as Yisrael Beytenu.
193
 Therefore even though 
the size principle and the policy distance principle on the surface did not seem to apply in 
the coalition forming, this deviation is explained with Netanyahu securing for Likud the 
greatest leverage within the coalition.  
As a result of forming such coalition, Netanyahu underlined Likud‟s role as the 
pivotal actor: even though most of the coalition partners were positioned to their right, 
strengthening Labor and excluding the most nationalist party secured Likud‟s role in the 
center. While converged to a right-wing bloc, Yisrael Beytenu is largely secular and 
opposed to ultra-orthodox parties on religious issues. This makes them unlikely to reach a 
deal over Likud, but makes it more difficult to keep them on board in clashes over religion.  
 
3.2.3 Maintaining the grand coalition  
Until September 2010, when a fresh round was launched in DC, no direct 
negotiations between Israel and the PA had been held since September 2008. This brief 
round came to halt when the 10-month moratorium on settlement construction passed on 
26 September 2010. The negotiations reached an impasse when PA demanded an extension 
to the freeze, but Netanyahu declared that the PA must recognize Israel as a Jewish state 
before. At that time, the Jewish public was split whether a long-term freeze would be of 
Israel's interest, even if it was compensated by a stronger U.S. commitment against the 
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possible Iranian nuclear program.
194
 However, a large majority of 74% backed Netanyahu 
in his demand of recognition before the extension.
195
 Netanyahu was stuck between 
American pressure and criticism of his right-wing coalition partners, including members of 
Likud, accused of cowering before the PA. With the PA rejecting Netanyahu's proposal, 
talks stalled.
196
  
Without any formal termination, both Israel and the PA, as well as the international 
community reached a stalemate that lasted throughout the end of 2010 and into 2011. In 
February 2011, Netanyahu declared that security is of utmost importance in the 
negotiations, implying that its priority is higher than of recognition. To counter the 
international pressure and the PA's strengthening push for establishing a state within the 
1967 borders, Netanyahu expressed a wish to discuss laying down some temporary 
borders. Despite that, no plan for an interim agreement was proposed.
197
  
On 22 November 2010, the Knesset amended a law from 1999 about ceding Israeli 
territory. The new law requires a national referendum for land-for-peace deals, unless two 
thirds of the Knesset support the concession.
198
 In practice, it refers to the annexed East 
Jerusalem and Golan Heights, as well as possible land swaps. It does, however, lay 
additional restrictions for any government that wishes to hold successful negotiations with 
the Palestinians, especially if some parts of disputed territories are further annexed. On the 
other hand, the referendum requirement was also seen as a possibility to overcome the far-
right‟s opposition in the Knesset to giving up the West Bank , thus weakening their stance 
as a domestic constraint.
199
  
The law passed by a vote of 65 to 33. However, most of the ruling Labor party 
ministers abstained from voting despite lobbying from the right-wing parties, additional 
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five MKs from Labor voted against.
200
 After the law was challenged in the Supreme Court 
for limiting the Knesset's capacities, the next Israeli government of 2013 decided to pass 
same terms by embedding them in a basic law. Israel does not have a formal constitution, 
but basic laws create a constitutional basis for overruling other legislation.
201
 
In January 2011, the leader of the Labor party and defense minister Ehud Barak 
split from Labor to form a breakaway faction, the Independence Party. Barak's move came 
after intense pressure from within the party and left-wing public to walk away from the 
government because of its right-wing orientation, including towards the peace process. 
Subsequently, Labor joined the opposition. Five MKs from the Independence Party 
remained in the coalition, thus a fairly comfortable majority of 66 seats was maintained.
202
  
The biggest winner of this split, however, was Netanyahu. He was able to remove 
the threat that the whole Labor leaves, which would have brought the coalition to a very 
narrow majority of 61 seats. Labor MKs had not been reliable in votings, but a remaining 
smaller split-off depended on Netanyahu in their political standing. Barak remained as a 
counter-balance to Likud's right-wing allies. It is unknown if and how much Netanyahu 
pressed for the move, but his involvement was suggested in the reporting.
203
 In any case, 
the move made the coalition in general and Likud in particular, being the pivotal actor, less 
vulnerable to losing power.  
In 2011 and 2012 the Israeli government was occupied by domestic issues. They 
had just recovered from a historically low support after a surprising wave of protests 
against the rising costs of living in 2011, when a religious split in the coalition threatened 
to bring the government down.
204
 The crucial vulnerability to Israel's right-wing bloc is the 
issue of exceptional rights for Ultra-Orthodox Jews. With religious parties demanding that 
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their base‟s exemptions from the Israeli Defense Forces continue and secular-nationalist 
parties fervently against it, any renewal of this or any other religiously driven issue makes 
the task of keeping a government together extremely difficult for the pivotal actor.  
At first, Netanyahu's decision was to call for early elections. It was prompted by 
Likud's strong showing before their main rival, Kadima, and it replacing the more popular 
leader Livni with Shaul Mofaz. However, while the Knesset was working on legislation to 
dissolve itself, Netanyahu and Mofaz agreed to form a national unity government in order 
to find a solution to the Ultra-Orthodox conscription issue. The attempt failed, weakening 
the position for both major parties. The short-lived government lasted for just over two 
months, but it did bring about the largest majority coalition in Israel's history: 94 seats. The 
government kept itself together in the autumn, but when the need to make major cuts to the 
2013 budget became apparent, Netanyahu chose to face elections rather than a budget fight 
in an unstable coalition.
205
  
Neither Likud nor other parties tried to play the Palestinian issue above Israeli 
domestic concerns. Presumably, they realized that this gambit could easily fail by 
questioning the occupation‟s role in rising expenses. The government declared their 
opposition to the PA's efforts for accession the United Nations and voted against their 
upgrade to a non-member observer state in 2012.
206
 The Obama administration tried to 
convince Israelis to negotiate, but with lack of political will their efforts did not bear fruit.  
The Palestinian issue gained attention again only with Operation Pillar of Defense 
against Gaza in November 2012, but even then it did not rise to become the prominent 
issue in the upcoming elections. The public opinion about the operation was divided, with 
almost half of Israelis wishing to see a ground invasion. Some right-wing politicians 
attacked the government for agreeing to a ceasefire and as a result, Likud lost support in 
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the polls.
207
 Overall, however, the usual security dimension gave way to socio-economic 
and religious issues that had been defining the political developments in 2011 and 2012. 
 
3.2.3 Elections in 2013: Likud wins but loses 
These elections saw the prominence of social media as a campaign platform. 
Particularly, Lapid, Netanyahu and Naftali Bennett from the Jewish Home were labeled 
even before the elections as successful users of Facebook as a political channel; their pages 
were all considerably more popular than the parties they were members of.
208
 
The 2013 election race was played out more within the blocs than between them. 
The polling before the election did not indicate a close fight. Furthermore, the merger of 
Likud and Yisrael Beytenu had all but secured Netanyahu's seat as a prime minister, 
because even though it did not raise their support compared with share of seats in the 
outgoing Knesset, the alliance had no close rival. With the common assumption that 
Netanyahu was going to form the government, all parties tried to gain votes at the expense 
of their close neighbors. This played out strongest in the center and on the right, because 
these parties had more to win by gaining a larger presence in the upcoming coalition.
209
 
This proved troubling for Likud-Yisrael Beytenu due to their perceived winner 
status: without a legitimate call of mobilization, they saw their support shifting to a 
religious-Zionist alliance, the Jewish Home.
210
 After the elections, it became apparent that 
additionally, some moderate right-wing voters had shifted to a new center party, Yesh 
Atid, leaving Likud-Yisrael Beytenu with 31 seats in the Knesset, a considerable setback 
from 42 seats they had held between them before.
211
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Yair Lapid, the leader of Yesh Atid, became the biggest winner of the elections. 
After Kadima‟s collapse due to their short and unsuccessful endeavor in the government, 
the center vote promised returns for all moderates. Throughout the campaign Lapid had 
insisted that he is 'center-center', not leaning towards the left bloc. He also did not declare 
that he would not support Netanyahu as Prime Minister. These tactics worked and Yesh 
Atid was able to secure the center vote, together with gaining some support from the 
moderate right. Thus it became the second-largest party with 19 seats, just one seat less 
than Likud‟s share from the alliance.212 While Yesh Atid was hailed as the kingmaker,213 
the 61 seats that the right-religious bloc had won, without counting center seats, would 
have given a narrow majority to Netanyahu regardless. 
The outcome of the elections for Likud was a loss of their bargaining power and 
shift to right. Even though Netanyahu remained central in coalition-forming, the pivotal 
power of Likud was lost, when Yesh Atid and the Jewish Home announced their alliance 
in the coalition negotiations. Together, they held 31 seats, tying Netanyahu's hands to 
either include them both or form an ideologically incohesive coalition with the Ultra-
Orthodox parties and the left. Ideologically, Likud-Yisrael Beytenu was able to regain their 
pivotal position by forming a coalition with Yesh Atid and Hatnuah, a Livni-led split-off 
from Kadima in their left, and the Jewish Home in their right. But the partnership between 
Yesh Atid and the Jewish Home, apparently based on socio-economic issues and their 
leaders' personal sympathies, had greatly reduced Likud's standing in the government. 
Yesh Atid's demand to cut the cabinet size meant that Netanyahu lacked bargaining power 
within his own party too.
214
  
The right and left, concerning security and religion, are the main dimensions of 
Israel‟s coalition forming. In the 2013 elections this was not as salient than in others. The 
Palestinian issue was marginalized, with clear dividing lines between the parties only on 
the topic of Ultra-Orthodox conscription, which is more connected to internal cohesion and 
the economic expenses of supporting a large class of non-workers than just a security 
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issue. This, however, meant that the success of far-right nationalist parties was understated. 
Having gradually grown since the end of the 1980s, the far-right parties won over a third of 
the seats
215
 and several cabinet posts that are closely related to settlement building.
216
 
Because the Ultra-Orthodox electoral potential was already maximized in the 
2000s, the growing support has been attained by ultra-nationalist and more secular parties. 
They have been expanding from their natural stronghold of Israeli settlers to other 
segments in the society, gaining support from the middle class and higher echelons as well. 
Furthermore, the far right parties were able to push their terms to the election‟s discourse. 
The right-wing has long claimed that Israel is willing to work for peace but there is no 
partner for that on the Palestinian side, and that the two-state solution is neither attainable 
nor legitimate. Because the left-wing has not been able to provide a credible ideological 
alternative, the beliefs of the right have been imposed on the center and center-left parties 
as well.
217
 
 
3.2.4 From negotiations to war 
The 33rd government did not adopt similar policy guidelines as the previous one 
had. Instead Netanyahu signed individual agreements with coalition partners: the first with 
Hatnuah and then, right before the deadline of the allowed coalition-forming period, with 
Yesh Atid and the Jewish Home, the latter two containing detailed plans about reforming 
the military service and the electoral system. On paper, these agreements were quite 
promising for progress on the Palestinian issue. The first contract with Hatnuah included a 
section for designating a ministerial negotiations team, consisting of Netanyahu, Livni as a 
minister of Justice, and the Ministers of Defense and of Foreign Affairs. The objective of 
that team is to reach "a political agreement with them that will end the conflict". Similar 
provisions were agreed with other two coalition partners.
218
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Following a coalition agreement and intense persuasion by the US Secretary of 
State John Kerry, a new round of direct negotiations between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians was started in July 2013, facilitated by the US. These talks were described as 
only a third serious and extended attempt to reach an understanding between to parties 
after the collapse of the Oslo process, and the first time when the final status talks had an 
Israeli leader from Likud in the driving seat. Final status issues concern the most contested 
matters, with the objective of ending the conflict by finding a solution to these issues.
219
  
Both parties had to make unpopular concessions so the negotiations could resume, 
although unlike last time, Israel did not have to implement a moratorium on settlement 
construction. The reason for not including this clause to the restart agreement was a 
mistaken belief by the US negotiators that Israel had informally agreed to such a clause. 
When Israel announced their plans to advance with the settlements, the Palestinian public 
accused their representatives of selling out. Similarly, the Israeli government met fierce 
criticism, especially from the right wing public, for having agreed to release some 
Palestinian prisoners. Because the prisoners were not released at the same time, but in three 
stages, a loud outcry against the government was repeated throughout the autumn. All 
prisoner releases where accompanied with announcements of settlement building. Even 
though the prime minister is not in charge of all steps in the process of gaining an approval 
for a construction, they can stop it at any point. Furthermore, the timing of these 
announcements was unlikely to be accidental, showing an intent to win over the hostile 
domestic public.
220
  
In addition to the public backlash, the negotiators faced opposition from within the 
government as well. In December, the MKs of Likud pushed for a bill that would annex 
parts of the Jordan Valley and maintain the settlements there. Netanyahu was vague in his 
support for settlements, while simultaneously insisting that the Jordan Valley should 
remain under Israeli control. Livni from Hatnuah was opposed to such legislation, as it 
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would set another domestic constraint for matters that in her view should have been left for 
negotiations.
221
  
During the nine months dedicated to the talks, the leading negotiators met on a 
regular basis, and Kerry met separately with Netanyahu and the PA President Abbas. 
When at the end of the year it became apparent that a comprehensive agreement would not 
be reached, the parties opted to find an understanding of what the parameters would be for 
a final agreement. A framework document was drafted by the Israelis and Americans and 
proposed to Abbas. Then the talks stalled. Abbas did not want to discuss the matter further 
before the fourth release of prisoners that was set for March had been completed, because 
he did not want to allow the Israelis to use these prisoners as leverage in the negotiations. 
Netanyahu insisted that the prisoners would only be released if the negotiations were 
continued.
222
  
No mutual agreement was reached. The remaining set of prisoners was not 
released, the PA joined several UN bodies and the criticism over settlement construction 
continued. An already difficult environment for negotiations had turned into a blame game, 
due to the complete absence of trust. The final blow to the negotiations occurred when 
Fatah and Hamas formed an unity government in April 2014, giving Israel an excuse to 
call of the negotiations few days before they were set to expire. It was reported that 
Netanyahu was the initiator for suspending the talks, as it had not been decided in a 
meeting with other senior ministers.
223
  
The Israeli public had been skeptical towards the negotiations since the beginning. 
In July, 80% of Israeli Jews said that the negotiations are unlikely to reach an agreement; 
the Israeli Arabs were split. The skepticism was due to negative views towards the 
Palestinian engagement in the peace process: 64% of Jews did not believe that they are 
genuinely interested in negotiations; nearly the same share had that opinion regarding the 
Israeli government. The trust in the government was highest among the centrist voters. 
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60% of Jews trusted that Netanyahu would safeguard Israel's security, but only 48% 
believed that his conduct would be guided by the ethic "to the extent that it depends on 
Israel, a peace treaty will be signed".
224
  
In April 2014, 57.5% of Jews saw the Fatah-Hamas agreement as dangerous for 
Israel; an even larger majority of 68% supported halting the negotiations for having signed 
a reconciliation agreement. Crucially for the government, the support was determined by 
the political views of the respondents, with 82% of right-wing voters and 59% in the center 
backing the government, but only 26% on the left in favor.
225
  
The relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians reached a new low in the 
summer of 2014. The tunnel building under Gaza‟s borders increased after Operation Pillar 
of Defense in 2012. The construction sector had been vital for employment, thus Israel's 
decision to prohibit construction materials from entering Gaza weakened the already 
fragile economy. On June 12, 2014, three Israeli religious students were kidnapped in the 
West Bank. Both Israel and the PA laid the blame on Hamas, but the extent of their 
involvement is unclear.
226
 The same day Israel launched raids in the West Bank to locate 
the students. With the blame game, Hamas had lost a possibility for reconciliation which 
would have alleviated their dreadful economic situation. Hence, they opted for a 
heightening of tensions in the occupied territories, with the hope that a military 
confrontation would ensure their stay in power. Weeks of retaliation and counter-
retaliation followed, involving both Hamas operatives and the IDF troops as well as the 
general public.
227
  
Israel's political leadership was not eager to go to war, but Netanyahu and the 
Defense Minister, together with the Chief of Staff were withholding information from the 
security cabinet. According to some accounts, the military misread Hamas's evolvement 
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into a hybrid terrorist-state structure and the latter‟s necessity to address the economic 
distress of Gaza‟s residents, even if that meant escalating the conflict with Israel.228 On a 
scale from 0 to 10, from inadequate to excellent, the right-wing Israelis assessed the prime 
minister's actions during the kidnapping and the subsequent searches to be at 6.8, among 
centrists it was 6.2 and among left-wingers 4.1. Thus, the evaluation of the government's 
supporters was above the medium but not notably high. 67% thought that Israel should not 
have had release the Palestinian prisoners for the negotiations.
229
 All this created a tense 
political environment, where the domestic pressures were inclining the government to take 
action, Hamas was launching rockets daily and the cabinet was sharply divided over the 
extent of a military operation.
230
 
The Operation Protective Edge was launched on July 8. The ground forces were 
pulled out from Gaza on August 5, and the ceasefire was announced on August 26, making 
it the longest war Israel has had with Gaza. The Israeli leadership still held that Hamas was 
dragging them into a war they did not want to have. Notably, the military offered to de-
escalate the conflict even after the operation had begun, they were against deploying IDF 
troops to Gaza for a long-term period and the government insisted that their intention is not 
a regime change in Gaza. This sharpened the internal divisions within the cabinet, with 
some ministers supporting far grander ambitions than the Israeli leadership was willing to 
demonstrate.
231
  
In the first weeks of the operation the Jewish public was almost unanimously 
backing the operation, with several right-wing senior politicians and some army officers 
criticising the government for not being forceful enough. A deputy defense minister lost 
his job for publicly questioning the government.
232
 At the end of the ground operation, 
fully 83% of Israelis approved the performance of the Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, while 
Netanyahu and the Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon were supported by 77%. The political 
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leadership was able to secure the support from both the center-left, which was not 
interested of toppling Hamas, and their natural camp of right-wing voters, which was at 
least pleased that Israel had taken military action against Hamas, if not entirely satisfied 
with the limited outcomes of the operation.
233
 The rallying around the flag effect continued 
even after the end of the operation, with paradoxical results: over half of the Jews did not 
believe that Israel had achieved many of its objectives, 61% did not trust the Israeli 
leadership, but a same amount considered the government's performance security-wise to 
be satisfactory. Slightly more were in favor of resuming the negotiations with the 
Palestinians,
234
 although a large majority was against inviting Hamas.
235
 Despite the 
potential support for holding negotiations, no direct talks have occured since.  
 
3.2.5 Elections in 2015: Likud’s surprise victory 
An internal rift within the coalition became evident, when in early December 2014 
Netanyahu fired Finance Minister Lapid and Justice Minister Livni, thus effectively getting 
rid off two coalition partners. Netanyahu justified his decision with the claim that both had 
plotted for his removal from the prime minister's office, and that after the collapse of 
negotiations in the spring Livni had had a separate meeting with the PA president 
Mahmoud Abbas behind the cabinet's back. In a few days, the Knesset passed a resolution 
of dissolving itself and calling for new elections in March 2015. The election campaigns 
started immediately, with former coalition partners attacking each other fiercely. The first 
opinion polls had Likud in the lead, then the Jewish Home and Labor, with Yesh Atid 
losing half the seats they had won in the previous elections. The newcomer in the center 
was Kulanu, led by a former Likudnik Moshe Kahlon.
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These were the first elections with the highest threshold in Israel‟s history. In May, 
Yisrael Beytenu had pushed through the proposal of raising the threshold to 3.25%, a plan 
that was clearly directed against the Arab parties, which would have difficulties passing a 
higher threshold. To gain the approval for this bill, however, it was packed together with 
the laws of expanding the conscription of Ultra-Orthodox Jews and making the referendum 
bill for withdrawing sovereignty from a territory to a basic law. Each of these bills were in 
the interest of a separate coalition partner, with others much less enthusiastic about voting 
in favor, thus passing them together ensured Netanyahu that the coalition would stand 
together.
237
  
In December, Jordan pushed the UN Security Council to establish terms for the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty, but the resolution was rejected, gaining only eight 
approvals instead of the needed nine. In any case, the US had declared intent to use its veto 
power against passing any Palestinian measures before the Israeli elections.
238
 Livni tried 
to reap the benefits by declaring that the US had taken her advice, making world leaders 
listen to her. The right-wing responded harshly, with the leader of the Jewish Home, 
Naftali Bennett saying that Livni had taken action behind the government's back and 
Defense Minister Ya‟alon from Likud criticizing her for involving foreign leaders in Israeli 
political matters.
239
  
On the left, Labor and Hatnuah merged to form the Zionist Union, a joint list that in 
the polls showed to be more popular than two parties separately. Both the Union and Likud 
strengthened its support throughout the winter. Netanyahu ruled out the formation of a 
national unity government. The uncovering of a corruption scandal involving the 
leadership of Yisrael Beytenu had caused substantial damage to their popularity, pushing 
Lieberman to appeal also to center, rather than solely right-wing voters.
240
 The four Arab 
parties merged to a Joint List to ensure that they cross the threshold, thus the bill that was 
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directed at weakening the Arab parties had the effect of consolidating them.
241
 United 
Torah Judaism and Shas announced that they would oppose inviting Yesh Atid to a 
coalition.
242
 These developments reinforced the two constraints in coalition-building: 
center-left cannot include the Arab parties and right-wing cannot leave out the Ultra-
Orthodox parties unless they have a strong center support or a national unity government. 
With the UTJ and Shas statements, the religious parties all but declared their complete 
support for Likud, making coalition-forming without Netanyahu improbable.  
Up until the last two weeks, the campaign had been unfocused, with fragmented 
statements in the social media and criticism of the prime minister over the damaging 
housing crisis report, but not much public attention to elections. In the last phase, the 
parties reinforced their attempts to define the election's central issue. Netanyahu called for 
supporting him so the left-wing would not win, while the Zionist Union hammered that it 
is time for Netanyahu to go home.
243
 The latest opinion polls showed stronger support for 
the Zionist Union than Likud, leading Netanyahu to launch his Gevalt campaign,
244
 a last-
minute attempt to mobilize right-wing voters by all costs.
245
  
On March 16, a day before the elections, Netanyahu declared that he would never 
allow a Palestinian state and enhanced pledges in favor of settlement building.
246
 Three 
days later and after a fierce reaction from the US, he retracted from that statement, 
declaring his continuous support for the positions he had laid out in his Bar-Ilan speech in 
2009. He clarified that his earlier claim referred to the current Palestinian leadership whose 
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views must be changed for achieving progress in the peace process.
247
 On the election day, 
he pleaded all voters to vote for Likud, because left-wing NGOs are bringing Arab voters 
on buses to booths to overthrow the right-wing government. Additionally, Likud sent an 
SMS to voters to alert them against the plot by Abbas and American money to encourage 
Israeli Arabs to vote. This warning was immediately repeated by Yisrael Beytenu and the 
Jewish Home.
248
 A week after the elections Netanyahu claimed to regret his remarks and 
that his intention had not been to offend the Israeli Arabs, but the Joint List did not accept 
his apology.
249
  
Nevertheless, these tactics proved effective, as Likud made a jump in the polls and 
won 30 seats against the Zionist Union‟s 24. While Netanyahu had maintained his position 
despite the unprecedented mobilization of opposition members, citizen activists, a number 
of senior defense officials and the US criticized his actions harshly.
250
 In addition, the 
religious parties, the Jewish Home, Yisrael Beytenu and Yesh Atid all lost seats, thus 
limiting their bargaining power vis-à-vis Likud. A new center party Kulanu emerged with 
10 seats, ensuring their involvement to any coalition.
251
  
Even though Likud had emerged as the clear winner from the elections, the 
coalition-formation process succeeded only through difficult negotiations and within the 
last hours of the deadline.
252
 The coalition involved Likud (30 MKs), Kulanu (10), the 
Jewish Home (6), Shas (7), and United Torah Judaism (6), giving it a minimal winning 
coalition of 61 seats in the Knesset. Netanyahu had very limited room to manoeuvre in the 
negotiations: the number allocation and the already ruled out coalition possibilities meant 
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that the only choice he had was whether to include Yisrael Beytenu (6 MKs), United Torah 
Judaism, or both. He did, however, manage to strengthen his hand against all coalition 
partners. Netanyahu also kept the power over several central portfolios, such as the Foreign 
Ministry, as a way to lure other coalition partners, if they arose.
253
 The model by Ofek & 
Meydani (2016) suggests that when comparing the coalition to the Knesset, it is not only 
significantly more inclined towards right-wing and religious stances than the whole 
parliament, but the positions of the coalition were further from the center point than any 
other Knesset formation.
254
 
In the fragmented and personalized Israeli political system, a minimum winning 
coalition does not bode stability. Because Yisrael Beytenu had not been satisfied with the 
religious concessions made to Ultra-Orthodox parties and to the Jewish Home that was 
supporting them, they initially opted out of the government.
255
 Their absence, however, 
was not in Netanyahu‟s interest and he kept working on finding solutions to bring them 
onboard. Yisrael Beytenu joined the coalition in May 2016, expanding the majority to 66 
seats. The final compromise was cut between the leaders of Yisrael Beytenu and Kulanu, 
with the former demanding a rise in the pensions for the immigrants from the former 
Soviet Union. Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon only agreed to that by expanding the 
increase of allowances to all eligible pensioners. While announcing that agreement, 
Netanyahu also called for the Zionist Union to form a unity government that could pave 
way for reaching peace accords with the Palestinians. For Isaac Herzog, leader of the 
Labor party, joining a coalition steered by the two nationalist hawks, Avigdor Lieberman 
from Yisrael Beytenu and Naftali Bennett from the Jewish Home, was unacceptable.
256
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3.2.6 Israelis adjust to violence 
While Netanyahu had backtracted from his position against the two-state solution, 
several ministers from his new government, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi 
Hotovely and Education Minister Bennett rose up to declare their stances against it. 
Specifically Bennett associated his refusal of the two-state solution with the international 
BDS movement against Israel, claiming that the Israeli answer to the boycott is building 
more settlements.
257
 The Jewish Home has long been advocating for annexing parts of the 
West Bank, with Bennett proposing an unilateral annexation plan in 2014.
258
 
In addition to organized rocket attacks from Gaza, individual Palestinians from the 
West Bank have used violence against the Jews in the occupied territories and in Israel 
proper. Several phases of violent outbursts can be identified. In 2014, a wave of violence 
erupted in East Jerusalem, gaining strength throughout the following year. Dubbed the 
Jerusalem Intifada in Palestinian social media, these assaults were described as being 
carried out by individual lone-wolf aggressors, using knives or vehicles.
259
 In October 
2015, the preliminary phase gave way to a full-scale unrest. The level of violence 
decreased in the summer of 2016. From October 2015 to September 2016, 280 attacks by 
330 individuals were perpetrated.
260
 In contrast, during the preliminary phase 16 attacks 
were carried out, or „tested‟.261  
This surge of violence differed from the intifadas in several ways. Instead of a large 
popular uprising, the outbreak of violence included a small segment, mostly consisting of 
teens and young adults. The choice of targets shifted from the Israeli civilians to security 
officials. Most importantly, the stabbings lacked strong support from both the Palestinian 
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authorities and the Palestinian general public.
262
 The exact extent of the involvement of 
organizations in these attacks is disputed. In the media they were characterized as lone 
wolf-attacks, meaning the assailant does not follow the orders from a terrorist 
organization.
263
 In the 2014 cases, however, previous connections with Hamas were 
identified.
264
 In 2015 and 2015, the Palestinian organizations did not seem to be directly 
involved.
265
  
Israel's government's reaction was to tie the eruption of violence with the assaults 
of radical islamists in the Western countries. Thus, Netanyahu made a link between the 
Palestinian nationalistic terrorism to Islamic terrorism as originating from the same 
source.
266
 Hence he used the tactic of framing the issue in terms that would appeal to the 
international audience, while subduing the specific conditions of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
At the same time when stabbing attacks were gaining ground, there appears to be a 
relative serenity in the firing of rockets to Israel from Gaza. In 2015, 23 rockets were 
launched at Israel and in 2016, the number dropped to 15. In the following year the figure 
doubled to 35, but most of them were launched in december after Trump declared his 
intent to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thus implicitly recognizing 
Jerusalem as Israel‟s capital. These are all very small figures compared with the 4879 
rockets fired during Operation Protective Edge in 2014. This reflects a usual pattern in the 
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Israeli-Hamas conflict dynamic: the attacks escalate to the point where Israel retaliates 
harshly, then the rocket fire dies out for some time.
267
  
In 2018 and 2019, this pattern, however, changed. There is no summarized data for 
rockets launched in those years, but the number is counted in the hundreds. Both sides also 
suffered casualties.
268
 While Israel did respond to the waves of rockets by ordering air 
strikes, the response has not been on the same level as during the operations in 2008, 2012, 
and 2014. The limited response has occurred despite members of the coalition demanding 
harsher measures. At the end of 2015, when Israel and Hamas had signed another ceasefire 
after two days of intense rocket fire and Israel's retaliations, the Defense Minister Avigdor 
Lieberman quit from the government. He explained that in his view, Israel is capitulating 
to terror that is going to bring long-term damage to national security.  
Hamas in the Gaza Strip is the biggest headache for Netanyahu. Toppling them 
would bring Gaza back under Israel‟s full control, as PA does not have power nor 
legitimacy to claim Gaza, but which Israel does not want because of the costs involved. 
However, as long as Hamas keeps on firing rockets and escalating tensions, the Israeli 
population is pressing the government to act. The hardline members of the coalition are 
voicing their criticism openly, but Netanyahu cannot look for support from the center any 
more because the center-left parties are unwilling to work with him. A ground invasion is 
dangerous for him, however, because while it might produce a rally around the flag effect 
in a short run, the support might easily be lost after Israeli casualties start coming in.  
Thus he has opted for a compromise, in which Israel is responding to eruptions of 
rocket fire with airstrikes. The hardline politicians on the right do not see it as doing 
enough, and with each outburst they gain more support for uncompromising views. The 
IDF would be interested in looking for alternative ways, such as allowing some work 
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permits for the Gazan workforce.
269
 With the humanitarian situation in Gaza fragile, which 
prompts Gazans to force Israel to accept their demands, it is only a matter of time before 
another round of violence is escalated to a war.
270
 Yet the government does not seem to be 
willing to lay down a long-term strategy for neither fixing the crisis in Gaza nor combating 
the security threat. While inaction might be beneficial for securing their power in the short 
run, in the end it is only increasing the odds that the conflict would go out of hand.  
 
3.2.7 Elections in 2019: A referendum over Netanyahu 
As mentioned, the announcement of Yisrael Beytenu that they are resigning from 
the coalition due to the government's limited response to rocket attacks from Gaza put the 
Prime Minister to a dire position. Having already survived a number of crises within the 
coalition and back to a minimum winning coalition, Netanyahu lasted another month 
before dissolving the government. Again, the controversial Ultra-Orthodox conscription 
law proved itself to be the dividing line among the right-religious coalition, as it was 
unable to gain the majority needed to pass it. The elections were set for April 9, 2019.
271
 
The public approved of the Prime Minister calling for early elections, but was divided over 
the reasons for it: 37% of Jews thought that Netanyahu wanted to hold elections before the 
attorney general makes known if he will be indicted, 25% thought that he wanted to 
expand the coalition from 61 seats, and 24% thought that he was driven by both factors 
equally.
272
 
Netanyahu has been under criminal investigation since 2016. At the end of 2018 it 
started to present a concrete threat to his power, as the police recommended indicting him 
on charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. The attorney general accepted their 
                                                          
269
 Gottesman, Evan; Novik, Nimrod. (2019). Israel: Lost in Gaza? Israel Policy Pod, May 9. 
https://israelpolicyforum.org/2019/05/09/israel-lost-in-gaza/ (used May 15, 2019) 
270
 Tzuri, Matan. (2019). IDF officer warns humanitarian crisis in Gaza could trigger attacks on Israel. Ynet 
News, April 17. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5495872,00.html (used May 17, 2019) 
271
 The 2019 Elections. The Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-
parties/elections/2019/ (used May 5, 2019) 
272
 The Peace Index: December 2018. 
http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=338&monthname=December (used May 5, 2019) 
83 
 
recommendation, but declared that he would not prosecute him before the elections.
273
 
Netanyahu has been calling the criminal investigation against him as a political ploy by 
left-wing opponents, judiciary, and the media. He has also pledged that he would not 
resign if he was indicted.
274
 In the past years, proposals to expand the immunity of the 
MKs, and via expansion, of the ministers of the government, have been circulating in the 
Knesset. MKs enjoyed immunity until 2005, when their privileges were cut. Now they can 
request protection on the floor, but it is not granted immunity automatically. The proposed 
law has not yet been passed, but the possibility of adopting it is seen as interfering in an 
ongoing criminal investigation against the Prime Minister.
275
 Hence, these elections 
focused only on Netanyahu, with the right bloc rallying behind him and a new emerging 
center power proclaiming to protect Israel‟s rule of law.  
This threat to Netanyahu‟s power came from Benny Gantz, a former Chief of Staff 
who had worked under Netanyahu during the 2014 Gaza war. A day after calling for 
elections, he declared to be launching a new political party against Netanyahu. In February 
2019, Gantz, former defense minister Ya'alon, and Yair Lapid joined in a centrist alliance 
named Kahol Lavan, translated Blue and White, spearheading the merger to become a 
serious rival to Likud.
276
 In the next weeks, both Kahol Lavan and Likud as well as the 
center-left bloc and the center-right bloc raced in a dead heat. Without strong policy 
differences, both Netanyahu and Gantz tried to depict the other as a danger to Israel‟s 
democracy and power.
277
 Similarly to the two-party system that had characterized Israeli 
politics in the 1980s and 1990s, Likud and Kahol Lavan were competing to become the 
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biggest party in the Knesset, while the rest were either struggling to cross the threshold or 
comfortably above it, such as the Ultra-Orthodox parties and the far-left Hadash-Ta'al list, 
but unlikely to gather wider support. Hence the first fight was played out between Kahol 
Lavan and Likud as in who would gain the most votes. Even more importantly, however, 
the formation of the coalition after the elections would be determined by how many 
smaller parties crossed the threshold. 
In February, Netanyahu pushed the Jewish Home, Tkuma, and Otzma Yehudit to 
form a joint list, under the name of the United Right, to ensure that they would gain 
enough support to win seats in the Knesset. Tkuma had run with the Jewish Home 
previously, in both the 2013 and 2015 elections. The inclusion of Otzma Yehudit, 
however, faced harsh criticism in Israel and from abroad due to their affiliations with the 
extremist Kach party, which is outlawed in Israel.
278
 The powerful Jewish lobby groups in 
the US, The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee and the American Jewish 
Committee condemned publicly Netanyahu‟s alignment with such parties.279 Followingly, 
the Israeli Supreme Court banned one of Otzma Yehudit's leaders from running in the 
elections. While the court has been outlawing entire lists before, selecting a single member 
was an unprecedented move.
280
 
On March 25, 2019, US President Donald Trump officially recognized the Golan 
Heights as part of the Israeli territory. This move was perceived as a public endorsement 
for Netanyahu before the upcoming elections,
281
 giving Netanyahu a chance to depict 
himself as being able to make the US take steps that are benefitting for the Israeli cause. 
The Golan Heights were de facto annexed to Israel in 1981, even though for diplomatic 
reasons the Israeli government refrained from using this term. Up until the Syrian Civil 
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War the Prime Ministers of Israel were willing to treat the Golan Heights as deposit for 
securing a peace treaty with Syria. Contrary to the official positions of Likud, Netanyahu 
was seeking to conduct covert negotiations with Syria in 1998, and in 2010-2011 as a 
precaution against the growing influence of Iran. The Syrian Civil War that brought 
various rebel groups to the bordering territories in Golan broke this plan off, as the Syrian 
government could no longer guarantee the security arrangements.
282
  
In 2015 it was reported that Netanyahu tried to convince the US President Barack 
Obama to grant US recognition for the annexation, but the president did not submit to his 
attempt.
283
 With a change in the US administration, the Israeli government reinforced their 
efforts. When these requests bore fruit, almost all politicians running argued in favor of the 
recognition.
284
 Unlike the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Golan has never been a 
contentious issue in Israeli politics. In this case, shifts in the Israeli government‟s actions 
are likely to have occurred due to external reasons, with the combination of a collapsed 
Syrian state and an accommodating US president granting Israel the recognition it 
welcomed, but had not impatiently sought since the 1980s. The timing of that decision, 
however, justifies connecting it with the Israeli political campaign as an attempt to 
influence the internal political contestation.  
As another bid to rally the right behind him, few days before the elections 
Netanyahu announced his intentions of annexing the settlements in the West Bank if he 
gains another victory in the polls. He said that by extending Israeli sovereignty, he will not 
be distinguishing between settlement blocs and the isolated settlements far from the Green 
Line. He also stated that he would not transfer any sovereignty to the Palestinians, a clear 
refutation of the two state solution.
285
 The statement was widely reported in the Israeli and 
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international media. As the research has explored, this move is significant in two aspects. 
First, just as in 2015, Netanyahu made use of the Gevalt tactics, mobilizing the voters‟ 
base behind him with calls that the loss of their power is imminent. In that sense, the 
pledges made during the election campaign do not demonstrate clear intent for legislation, 
as Netanyahu has retracted from his words before. However, the announcement also 
represented the right-wing‟s foreign policy, which does not even try to hide their 
unwillingness to resolve the Palestinian issue any more.  
The close race in the election campaigns carried on until the end of the counting of 
the votes, as the double envelope ballots from the soldiers, hospitals, and prisons take 
several days to be added to the main count. In the end, Likud and Kahol Lavan tied on 35 
seats. The right-religious bloc, though several of its expected members did not cross the 
threshold, was able to gain the upper hand with 65 seats. All 65 right-wing MKs 
recommended to appoint Netanyahu as the prime minister and thus the president granted 
him a right to form the new government. At the time of presenting this thesis,
286
 the 
coalition has not been formed.  
Netanyahu has asked for an extension because the negotiations stalled over Yisrael 
Beytenu not accepting the demands of the religious parties for military exemption for 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews. Reportedly, he might establish a non-majority government on the 
hopes that Yisrael Beytenu would not oppose its swearing in, a move that would put all 
subsequent policy implementation into question.
287
 At the same time, there are 
speculations over the possibility that the Prime Minister might request adopting the 
immunity law from his future coalition partners, and over the demands that they might 
present in return - such as upholding his pledge to annex the settlements. Thus far, these 
are only speculations, although a MK from Likud has filed the bill to be presented in the 
Knesset.
288
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Netanyahu has confirmed that he seeks to enforce some legislation curbing the 
authority of the Supreme Court in order to pass the bills that have been struck down before. 
He named three bills: the expulsion of the family members of convicted terrorists, the 
capital punishment for terrorists, and deportation of illegal immigrants. However, the 
Court has rejected only the last, as the first two have not yet been adopted in the Knesset. 
If the Knesset gains supremacy over the Supreme Court for both past and future rulings, 
the Prime Minister can ensure that he is protected from criminal prosecution.
289
 As the 
Supreme Court has been the main institution that has prevented the government to adopt 
unconstitutional laws or amend the legislation they seek to pass so it would comply with 
the existing Israeli law, dismantling their powers would endanger the rule of law. The 
Supreme Court has also upheld the rights of the Palestinians, to some extent, so it would 
also hinder the possibility of conflict resolution. Having said that, before such legislation in 
the Knesset is passed, no concrete claims can be made. 
However, the standstill in the formation of the government implies difficulties in 
finding a common ground between the coalition partners. For a decade, Netanyahu has 
managed to maneuver between the religious parties, nationalists, and center to find 
compromises among ideologically distant factions. Skorek (2018) suggests that the almost 
fully right-wing coalition of 2015 is an anomaly, because Likud is ideologically closer to 
center-left parties than to its radical coalition partners. Netanyahu has excluded far-right or 
Ultra-Orthodox elements before, whereas they cannot form a government with the center-
left parties due to the incompatible demands and thus have less room for manoeuvre than 
Likud.
290
  
While this might be true in perspective of all Netanyahu‟s governments, the stances 
of the parties before the 2019 elections and the criminal investigation of Netanyahu makes 
it unlikely that Likud and Kahol Lavan are willing to form a national unity government 
under Netanyahu‟s lead. The resulting political situation is one where there exists a clear 
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majority for moderate policies, but the two major parties representing the center and 
center-right are unable to co-operate with each other. Instead, the right bloc is entrenched 
in a situation where almost no one has other options for sitting in a government, while 
contentious bills have been circling in the cabinet for years.  
It is yet unknown what would be the composition of the next government or its 
adopted policies. It will be probably based on the right-religious bloc as in the previous 
one, but shifted even more to the right. The thin majority of the probable coalition might 
convince partners to look for further concessions over controversial issues, increasing 
bargaining and controversy avoidance. It might also induce them to double down in their 
demands, as partners do not have other options to accommodate them. In all likelihood, 
however, the hawkish but apathetic behavior in foreign policy in regards to the Palestinians 
is going to continue and reinforce itself, as it has been the in the common interest of the 
right-religious parties.  
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of the thesis was to explore the role and impact of domestic factors in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict dynamic. To simplify between all sources of possible influence, 
the thesis has focused on the formation of the government and its actions in regard to the 
conflict. The choice to focus on the government was made on the basis of it being the main 
channel for domestic influence, as it executes the interests of its voting base to secure its 
stay in power. It limits the validity of the conclusions presented, but due to the impossible 
task of deducing all separate influences in the decision-making, restrictions were 
necessary.  
The last decade in Israel's politics has been characterized by rise of ethno-
nationalism, as indicated by the growing emphasis of the Jewish character of the state. This 
is due to the visibility and strength of the religious and nationalist parties in the 
government. Likud under Netanyahu started out as a pivotal actor in the government at a 
fairly centrist position. Nevertheless, maintaining the grand and ideologically diverse 
coalition during the second Netanyahu government eventually ran into the sand. With each 
subsequent election Netanyahu has had less of a choice in coalition partners, as junior 
parties have presented exclusive demands.  
Increased powers for religious and radical factions have resulted in the 
government's paralysis in resolving the contentious issues in Israeli politics. In addition to 
the Palestinian question and the costs the protraction of the conflict entails for the society, 
these vexed issues are also the military conscription of the Ultra-Orthodox Jews and the 
extent of the powers of the judiciary system. The military exempt for Ultra-Orthodox has 
been ruled as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, yet several governments have been 
incapable of finding a compromise; including Netanyahu's third government in 2013-2015 
which did not contain religious parties and was thus in the best position to pass enforcing 
legislation. At the same time, the attempts to retroactively legalize Israeli outposts in the 
West Bank set the government on a collision course with the Supreme Court.  
These bills demonstrate the internal divisions within the coalitions. Secular 
nationalists wish to prevent expansion of the role of religious law, settlers wish to expand 
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Israel's control over the West Bank, which requires curbing the judicial authority, which 
has been occasionally blocked or toned down by center parties, and the latter join 
nationalists in resisting the religious forces. All these forces thrive on the stance of 
defending the majority rights against the internal and external enemies. Thus they have 
used divisive tactics, proven to be efficient in a fragmented Israeli electorate. 
To overcome the conflictual interests within the coalition, the government has 
sought to avoid controversial issues or demonstrated inactivity towards them. At the same 
time, they have attempted to legitimize the regime by antagonizing the opponents: first 
Arab citizens of Israel and human rights organizations as vocal criticizers of the regime, 
then the media and judiciary system, are all lumped together as leftist enemies. In addition 
to the internal troubles within the left, the delegitimization of the opponents has led to the 
state in which current left and center politicians have difficulties in presenting a credible 
alternative to the conflictual policy pursued by the government. This has resulted in 
decline in support of the two-state solution (appendix 1) and the general turn to the right, 
which has been characterizing Israeli society in the past decade. Both of these 
developments further reinforce the hawkish foreign policy conducted by the government, 
and get reinforced when this hawkish policy results in antagonism from the other side. This 
policy has been carried out despite the costs and the threats that the continuation of the 
conflict presents.  
The conflictual foreign policy in regards to the Palestinians has been based on the 
government‟s perception that offering concessions to the Palestinians harms Israel‟s 
security. Nevertheless, the policy of gradually eroding the possibility of a peaceful conflict 
resolution has a high chance of escalating into violence. Furthermore, the persistence of the 
conflict increases the danger of having to choose between being Jewish and being 
democratic. The continuation of the current policy of undermining judicial independence 
and retroactive legalization, strengthened by an increased dependence on extreme political 
factions, while sustaining the social divisions, makes upholding the principles of rule of 
law and democracy more fragile.  
This thesis presents an exploratory research into the reciprocal relations of 
domestic politics and foreign policy. It has examined a case of domestic actors conducting 
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conflictual foreign policy to entrench their power. As discussed, this conflictual behavior is 
not contained to only foreign policy, but has also had repercussions for the society as a 
whole. Controversy avoidance among and the accommodation of radical factions in the 
coalition can secure its power in the short-term, but puts the government in a more difficult 
position to solve long-term problems. The Israeli case has a specific condition in the form 
of the criminal investigation instigated against the Prime Minister, thus, in other cases the 
leading power's dependence on radical elements might be weaker. Nevertheless, 
accommodating to radical elements without requiring them to tone down, or with limited 
success in achieving that, increases their power. 
Legitimizing the regime might be more efficient in retaining power in long-term. 
However, it is dangerous for the pluralist Israeli society. The consequences of using the 
strategy of insulation is not as straightforward, as the negotiations and policy in regards to 
the Palestinians are still under domestic influence. The government has, however, achieved 
in sustaining a stance under which the society is willing to endure the costs of the conflict, 
does not believe in the feasibility of resolving it and does not demand it from the 
leadership.  
The results of the study indicate to possible ways for developing the theoretical 
framework to take into account the reciprocal nature between domestic politics and foreign 
policy in the situation of a protracted conflict. However, a single case study can only 
provide limited answers, thus, a comparative overview of cases is needed to lay the 
grounds for generalization. As the case is still ongoing, meaning that future developments 
can significantly affect its evaluation, further research is needed to review and refine the 
inferences made on the basis of the current evidence.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Support for two state solution 
 
Data from Shikaki, Khalil; Scheindlin, Dahlia. (2018). Role of Public Opinion in 
the Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A 
Joint Poll (2016-2018) Final Report. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research; 
The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. P 2.  
  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Israelis 68% 65% 69% 59% 71% 66% 56% 63% 58% 51% 55% 53% 49%
Palestinians 71% 66% 68% 61% 57% 55% 52% 53% 48% 51% 44% 52% 43%
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Appendix 2 
Election Results 
These lists present the parties that won seats in the Knesset with the number of 
seats gained. Parties are divided according to their political alignment as right (R), center 
(C), or left (L). The classification is made by the author with Likud and Labor as the key 
anchor points for right and left, thus labelling all parties between them as being in the 
center. 
The parties that formed the coalition after the elections are in bold, the parties that 
joined the coalition during the election cycle are in bold and italics.  
Data is from the Knesset website.
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Elections in 2009 
Kadima – 28 (C) 
Likud – 27 (R) 
Yisrael Beytenu – 15 (R) 
Labor – 13 (L) 
Shas – 11 (R) 
United Torah Judaism – 5 (R) 
United Arab List – 4 (L) 
National Union – 4 (R) 
Hadash – 4 (L) 
Meretz – 3 (L) 
The Jewish Home – 3 (R) 
Balad – 3 (L) 
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 The Knesset, Elections for the Knesset. https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/mk/Pages/Elections.aspx (used 
May 19, 2019) 
The Knesset, Currently Functioning Parliamentary Groups. 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionCurrent_eng.asp (used May 19, 2019) 
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Appendix 2 cont 
Elections in 2013 
Likud-Yisrael Beytenu – 31  
Yesh Atid – 19 (C) 
Labor – 15 
The Jewish Home – 12 
Shas – 11 
United Torah Judaism – 7 
Hatnuah – 6 (C) 
Meretz – 6 
United Arab List – 4 
Hadash – 4 
Balad – 3 
Kadima – 2 
 
Elections in 2015 
Likud – 30 
Zionist Union – 24 (L) 
Joint List – 13 (L) 
Yesh Atid – 11 
Kulanu – 10 (C) 
The Jewish Home – 8 
Shas – 7 
Yisrael Beytenu – 6 
United Torah Judaism – 6 
Meretz – 5 
 
 
 
117 
 
Appendix 2 cont 
Elections in 2019 
Likud – 35 
Kahol Lavan – 35 (C) 
Shas – 8 
United Torah Judaism – 8 
Hadash-Ta'al – 6 (L) 
Labor – 6 
Yisrael Beytenu – 5 
United Right – 5 (R) 
Meretz – 4 
Kulanu – 4 
Ra'am-Balad – 4 (L) 
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